Republican bill imposes major new out-of-pocket costs on the near-poor

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The draft legislation released by the House Energy and Commerce Committee on Sunday night (May 11) gnaws at Medicaid and marketplace spending from so many angles and inhibits enrollment in so many ways, it’s hard to know where the bulk of the enrollment reductions and benefit degradation will come from. By CBO’s preliminary estimate, the Medicaid and marketplace provisions will cut federal spending by $715 billion over ten years and increase the ranks of the uninsured by 13.7 million (if you include failure to extend funding for the enhanced marketplace subsidies provided by the American Rescue Plan Act, which are funded only through this year; expiration of those subsidies accounts for 4.2 million of the coverage losses).

On the Medicaid side, work requirements (a.k.a. red tape requirements) have been clearly shown to drive eligible people off the rolls without boosting employment. Work requirements may account for more than half of the 7.7 million reduction in Medicaid enrollment that CBO forecasts, based on prior Urban Institute estimates (CBO has not yet itemized its Medicaid enrollment loss estimate by provision). Increasing the frequency of redeterminations and suspension of Biden administration rules designed to streamline enrollment would also take a significant toll on enrollment.

Here I want to focus on a double-barreled assault imposing a different form of harm: increased out-of-pocket costs for those who do enroll in coverage, in particular those with income a step above poverty, i.e. 100-138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). In the 2025 ACA marketplace, which uses prior-year FPL, that’s income up to $20,783 for an individual, $43,056 for a family of four. For Medicaid, which uses current-year FPL, the thresholds are 3.9% higher. In the marketplace, we’ll also look at the broader 100-150% FPL bracket, since benchmark silver plans are available at zero premium up to 150% FPL under the enhanced subsides.

The case for Medicaid-like coverage at high-middle incomes: Alex Sheff of Health Care For All Massachusetts

Line up those ducks for ConnectorCare expansion

My last post focused on a plan in Massachusetts to extend eligibility for ConnectorCare, the state's unique low-cost health insurance program for marketplace enrollees with income up to 300% of the Federal Poverty Level, to residents with income up to 500% FPL. This past July, the state legislature passed a budget provision funding the eligibility extension for a two-year pilot period, but  Republican Governor Charlie Baker vetoed it.

Yesterday I spoke to Alex Sheff, policy director at nonprofit Health Care Access for All Massachusetts, a prime mover of the proposal, about the rationale for focusing new state spending on a relatively affluent income segment -- those with household income ranging from $40,770 to $67,950 for an individual and from $83,5250 to $138,750 for a family of four. HCFA commissioned an actuarial study, conducted by Gorman Actuarial Associates, that sketched out the proposal's parameters. HCFA provides phone help to Massachusetts resident who need help enrolling in health coverage and stresses that its policy proposals derive from trends gleaned from the call line.

To keep background as short as possible here (see the last post for more): ConnectorCare features a standardized benefit design (varying somewhat by income bracket) with zero deductibles, low copays, and annual maximum out-of-pocket (MOOP) cost limits lower than those generally available in a conventional state ACA marketplace. Those costs are modestly lower than in the ACA marketplace at the lowest incomes, but much lower at the 200-300% FPL level.* ConnectorCare premiums range from $0 at incomes up to 150% FPL** to $130 per month for a solo enrollee with income in the 250-300% FPL range.

On adding an out-of-pocket cost cap to traditional Medicare

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Medicare's annual Open Enrollment Period is in progress, and enrollment in Medicare Advantage (MA) is poised to exceed enrollment in traditional, fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare for the first time in 2023. Stat's Bob Herman spotlights advocates' case for erasing MA's most consequential competitive advantage by adding an annual out-of-pocket cost cap (OOP cap) to traditional, fee-for-service Medicare:

At least 1 in 5 people* who choose Medicare Advantage — the alternative to traditional Medicare that is operated by health insurance companies — say they choose it because of the out-of-pocket limits that insurers offer, according to a new survey from the Commonwealth Fund.

According to a Kaiser Family Foundation estimate, as of 2018, about one in six FFS Medicare enrollees (counting only those enrolled in both Part A and Part B**) lacked an OOP cap and were thus exposed to potentially catastrophic out-of-pocket costs. That comes to about 5 million enrollees in 2022. The other 25 million FFS enrollees in Parts A  and B have access to OOP caps -- usually quite low --  via either Medigap, an employer-sponsored supplemental plan, or dual eligibility in Medicare and Medicaid.

In a study commissioned by America's Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), Wakely actuaries calculated that adding a $6,700 OOP cap to FFS Medicare Parts A and B would increase per-person spending by 3.5%. Wakely cast that estimate as conservative, as it does not include an estimate of "induced demand"-- i.e., enrollees using more care because it's more affordable. A June 2022 Urban Institute analysis bears that out. Urban estimated the cost of a $7,550 cap -- the highest currently allowable by MA plans for in-network care -- at $25 billion per year, a 5% increase. But that cap is inclusive of Part D, which according to Urban's estimate accounts for about 18% of cost increases. A $7,550 cap for Parts A and B alone would presumably increase FFS costs by about 4%. Urban estimates that induced demand triggered by a $7,550 cap will increase total spending by all payers by $8 billion, or 1.6% (perhaps 1.3% with Part D omitted).  That added cost (not accounted for by Wakely) does seem to bring the Urban and Wakely estimates more or less in line. 

How prevalent is underinsurance among ACA beneficiaries?

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Big rain, small umbrella

In a New York Times op-ed Aaron Carroll, a physician and highly reliable assessor of data (his Bad Food Bible sifts expertly through a lot of bullshit in dietary research) makes two incontrovertible points about U.S. healthcare:

1. Americans are burdened with uniquely high out-of-pocket costs that induce us to forego need as well as unneeded care.

2. The ACA partly replicated this gaping flaw in our healthcare system, inflicting ridiculously high deductibles and out-of-pocket maximums on a significant number of marketplace enrollees.

But the argument includes what I regard as a slight (and common) distortion of emphasis in his overview of marketplace enrollees' high out-of-pocket costs: 

The average deductible on a silver-level plan on the A.C.A. exchanges rose to $4,500 in 2021. If people tried to buy plans with a lower premium, at a bronze level, the average deductible rose to more than $6,000. Granted, some cost-sharing reductions are available for those who make less than 250 percent of the federal poverty line, but even after accounting for those, the average deductible was more than $3,100 for silver plans.

The ACA wars through a pandemic lens: Nicholas Bagley looks back

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I spoke to Nicholas Bagley, health law professor at the University of Michigan, about measures to limit Americans' out-of-pocket exposure for coronavirus treatment -- assuming that in the U.S., simply covering all OOP for everyone treated for the disease at government-set payment rates to providers is not going to happen.

My thought was that Bagley could speak to avoiding legal pitfalls in any such measures. But his sense is that in the current crisis, legal concerns pertain mainly to potential administrative actions  (for example,  Can the CDC Pay for Everyone's Coronavirus Testing?).

Given normal U.S. legislative sclerosis, seeking regulatory authority to do what needs to be done is often fertile ground for legal analysis. Right now, though, the cards may line up for decisive legislative action, as they do in this country when (and only when) Republican political survival depends on it. And while there are multiple constraints to regulatory action, "there are fairly few constraints on Congress's legislative power," Bagley said. "Congress doesn't quite have carte blanche, but close to it. The question is not what does the Constitution allow Congress to do. We should be asking, 'what do we think ought to happen?' And then we should do it."

Limit Americans' out-of-pocket exposure for Coronavirus treatment

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The bill passed by the House yesterday to ease the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic, H.R. 6201, purports to make coronavirus testing available at no cost to all Americans. That includes office visits, urgent care center visits, and emergency room visits that lead to an order for testing.* It does not, however, include treatment for those who become seriously ill.

David Anderson and Nicholas Bagley are calling for Congress to rise to the crisis by protecting Americans against balance billing -- either by passing comprehensive consumer protection that's been stalled since last fall or, at a minimum, passing a bill to limit out-of-network billing for Coronavirus treatment.

That's vital. I've worried since late February that fear of balance billing would inhibit some Americans from seeking treatment. I've also noted a closely related problem: Americans' huge exposure to out-of-pocket costs for in-network care:

Six years later: Some stuff we've learned (or think we've learned) about the ACA marketplace

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The ACA marketplace is in its seventh year -- not a baby any more. I was just musing about some things we've learned, or think we've learned. Some are well understood, some are little recognized, some are tentative hypotheses. In no particular order:

• The marketplace came of age during a period of steadily rising employment. That's good news for the country, but has constituted a steady headwind for enrollment. ACA subsidies are on standby as a shock absorber for the next recession (if the courts don't kill the law).


• Since 2018, silver loading* has partly offset factors depressing enrollment, including massive cuts to outreach and advertising, rising incomes and employment, and rising premiums (in 2017-18) and out-of-pocket costs. As of 2019 silver loading had probably boosted enrollment by about 500,000.


• Those out-of-pocket costs have risen relentlessly. That's inevitable in a system where a fixed percentage of income buys a fixed actuarial value, since healthcare costs continue to rise far faster than inflation.  In 2014, the top allowable out-of-pocket maximum for a single enrollee was $6,350.  In 2021, it will be $8,550. The average silver plan deductible (for those who don't qualify for CSR) was $2,425 in 2014 and $4,544 in 2020.

For further study

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I'm going to be a little Labor Day weekend lazy here and jot down a few questions I'd like to look into, rather than provide any actual information about them. If you have any answers, please comment!

1. Credential inflation.  My wife, a certified nurse-midwife, rolls her eyes at the increasing impossibility of getting credentialed in her field without a doctorate. She spoke recently to a young labor & delivery nurse who's planning to become a midwife and is facing four years of study and likely debt. Apparently you can't get certified as a midwife in NJ now without doing the doctorate (not a Ph.D.), and that's a nationwide trend. "We have to do it," was the word for a university program director, because all the other nursing specialty and other non-physician medical professions like OT are doing it.

Benefit cliffs in the ACA marketplace

Dave Anderson highlights an important weakness in the subsidy structure for the ACA marketplace. As income rises, the enrollee's share of the premium for a benchmark silver plan is subject to sudden and irregular bump-ups, which Anderson compares to jolts in marginal tax rates.  Take the case of a couple looking to buy a benchmark silver plan:

From $17,000 to$20,000 this couple pays an extra $2 per month for every thousand dollars more they earn a year.  Annually this is about a 2% marginal tax rate on the additional income.  And then there is a huge bump from $20,000 to $21,000.  The benchmark premium suddenly becomes $256 more expensive.  This is a 25% marginal rate...

And then the marginal rate drops again when the family increases their earnings from $21,000 to $22,000.  The marginal rate for this slice is now about 11%.  The marginal rate for couples earning under 300% FPL is in the mid-teens, and then there is a drop in the marginal rate to just under 10% for 300% to 400% FPL and then a potential massive spike as soon as someone earns over 400% FPL.

The spikes in out-of-pocket (OOP) costs this couple is exposed to as income rises are even more sudden -- and, I think, potentially damaging to family finances -- than the premium spikes. The main benefit cliff is formed by the sudden fadeaway of Cost Sharing Reduction (CSR) subsidies at 201% FPL, where the actuarial value of a silver plan drops from 87% to 73%.  CSR disappears entirely at 251% FPL, and the coverage offered by a benchmark silver plan with no CSR, which has an AV of 70%, is clearly underinsurance for those without significant financial resources.

Cold comfort for low income workers insured through their employers

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The Kaiser Family Foundation and the Peterson Center on Health Care released a report yesterday showing that low income families enrolled in employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) pay a much higher percentage of their income on premiums and out-of-pocket expenses than do higher income employees. That isn't surprising, though the percentage of income eaten up by healthcare is disturbing. Families in ESI earning up to 199% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) spend an average of 14% of income on healthcare, according to Kaiser's analysis of Census data. Families with at least one member in poor or fair health spend an average of 18.5% of income on healthcare.

What is somewhat surprising -- to me, anyway -- is that lower income families with ESI do not spend more in absolute terms than better-paid employees. I was under the impression that low income workers are often offered much skimpier insurance than higher income workers. That impression was at least partly derived from Kaiser's annual Employee Health Benefits Survey. Here's the contrast between employers with mainly low- vs. high-income employees from the 2018 survey:

Can Medicare Advantage plans lower enrollees' out-of-pocket costs? A talk with Kaiser's Juliette Cubanski

A month ago, I took a look at the resources available -- or unavailable -- to Medicaid enrollees who face a "Medicare cliff" when they turn 65 -- that is, a transition from having basically all their medical expenses covered to a program that carries a monthly premium for most of $134, requires 20% copays for most medical services and potentially huge outlays for inpatient hospital care, and has no cap on out-of-pocket costs.

Some 10.7 million Medicare enrollees are "dual eligibles" of one kind or another -- enrolled either in ABD (Aged/Blind/Disabled) Medicaid, which provides comprehensive coverage,  or in Medicare Savings Programs (MSPs), which offer more partial coverage, or in some cases both.  But the income thresholds for all of these programs are lower than for Medicaid in states that accepted the ACA expansion, and the asset tests for the MSPs are quite low -- $7560 for an individual, excluding home and car.  The application process is complex, and help and outreach are underfunded.  (For a useful overview, see Josh Schultz.)

For the many seniors of quite limited means who don't qualify for MSPs, I wondered to what extent Medicare Advantage (MA) plans might function as a de facto discount plan. About one third of current Medicare enrollees are in MA plans. MA plans usually incorporate a Part D drug plan, and often the premium is lower than the combined premium for Medicare Parts B and D (e.g., in zero-premium plans, in which enrollees pay only their Medicare Part B premium).  MA plans may offer extra benefits, such as dental, vision or hearing coverage (often quite limited). Perhaps most importantly, they cap out-of-pocket costs at a maximum of $6,700 per year. The main tradeoff is acceptance of a limited provider network -- often quite limited.

I spoke to Juliette Cubanski, Associate Director of the Program on Medicare Policy at the Kaiser Family Foundation and lead author of a recent Kaiser report on healthcare spending in Medicare households, about the appeal, real or perceived, of Medicare Advantage plans for lower income Medicare enrollees.  An edited q-and-a is below.

xpostfactoid: Does Medicare Advantage often offer effective de facto discounts over traditional Medicare?

Addled by the metal level

Austin Frakt has a series of posts (1,2,3) reviewing research that highlights what a hard time most people have making good choices among insurance plans -- mainly in balancing premium against deductibles and copays. One such study, by a team led by Peter Ubel, highlights (to my mind) a defect in ACA marketplace design:

...two of us recruited a convenience sample of participants from public buses in Durham, North Carolina, and asked them which category of plans they would look at first if they were shopping for health insurance. To half the people, we described the gold plans as having higher monthly premiums and lower out-of-pocket costs — the language used by many exchanges. For the other half, we switched the gold and bronze plans, describing the gold plans as having lower monthly premiums and higher out-of-pocket costs.

...among participants who were below the median in mathematical ability, the majority said they preferred gold plans over bronze plans, regardless of which plan was labeled as gold.

In real life, of course, labeling skimpier plans "gold" would be deceptive marketing, and labeling superior plans with a less-valuable metal would be just plain stupid. But for about two thirds of marketplace customers, that latter mislabeling is pretty much what the marketplace does.

Hillary Clinton's pocket patches for healthcare costs

Hillary Clinton's  just-released package of proposed health reform proposals is very...Hillary Clinton. It's got a lot of moving parts and takes incremental whacks at a pervasive problem -- ever-rising out-of-pocket medical costs for the insured -- from multiple angles.  On the one hand, it layers complexity on complexity. On the other hand, its patches are tailored to provide complementary plugs to different holes in coverage that deter people from obtaining needed care and drain thousands from their earnings. And by the way, the most powerful ideas are are well below the top line.

Pocket patches

The  two lead proposals are aimed directly at the relentless rise in health plan holders' out-of-pocket costs for care. To reduce insureds' "skin in the game" that has become in many cases a pound of flesh, Clinton would

Mysteries of underinsurance in the Commonwealth Fund survey

A Commonwealth Fund survey released this week found that among those American adults under age 65 who were insured throughout 2014, 23 percent were underinsured – that is, their deductibles and copays were high enough to cause severe financial strain. That top line is almost unchanged since 2010; the real damage on this front was done from 2005 to 2010, when employers started shifting costs en masse to employees.

I have several questions about the report, to which I'm seeking answers from the authors. If you have any insight, please let me know (email address is in profile to right).

In the questions below, please keep in mind Commonwealth's definition of underinsured: 1) total out-of-pocket costs exceed 10% of annual income, or 5% if the person's household income is under 200% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), or 2) the plan deductible exceeds 5% of the beneficiary's annual income.

1. While deductibles in employer-sponsored plans continue to rise, most notably among those with less than 100 employees, the underinsurance rate actually dropped among large employers from 2012 to 2014, from 16% to 14%.  In the same period, the percentage of large-firm employees whose deductible exceeded 5% of annual income rose from 6% to 8%.  What's offsetting that rise in the ranks of those whose deductibles alone classify them as underinsured? Do the free preventive services mandated by the ACA play a role? Or rather, since "the out-of-pocket cost component of the measure is only triggered if a person uses his or her plan," could reluctance to use (and pay for) any medical services be inhibiting the underinsured total?

2. More generally, , among all insured Americans under age 65, Commonwealth finds an increase of 7 million since 2010 in those whose deductibles qualify them as underinsured, but a net increase in underinsureds of only 2 million . Again, something seems to be offsetting the relentless rise in deductibles. Since 2010,

Why do more people say the ACA has harmed than helped them?

One ongoing frustration for ACA supporters in public opinion polling is the fact that the number of people say that the ACA has directly harmed them and their families consistently outstrips the number who say it has directly helped them.

Now that the ACA is directly subsidizing health insurance for about 20 million people, that particular perception has narrowed but not closed. Here's a graph from the Kaiser Family Foundation, which polls on this question regularly:

Since last May, the gap has narrowed from 24-14 to 22-19. But it's still there, and the question is where the perception (and/or reality) of direct harm comes from.

On bronze-smithing the ACA

A couple of days ago I wrote about three conservative ways to change the ACA that would arguably increase viable options for individuals, insurers and (in one case) employers.  It occurs to me that a common thread runs through them all, and that thread may be twined round the heart of a system as invested as ours is in private enterprise, choice and competition.

Here are the three proposals:

1) Allow Cost Sharing Reduction (CSR) subsidies, currently available only with silver plans, to attach also to bronze plans, maintaining a proportionate difference in actuarial value between bronze and silver plans.

2) Allow smaller employers, or possibly even all employers, to fulfill the employer mandate by fully funding employee HSAs linked to HSA-qualified plans available on the ACA exchanges.

Will the ACA boost retirement savings?

The CBO's new projection that the Affordable Care Act would lead to a labor force reduction equivalent to 2.3 million jobs by 2021 stems in part from an assumption that some people will be reluctant to boost their income because doing so may reduce or eliminate their ACA subsidies.

Perhaps. The ACA includes some subsidy cliffs -- break points at which reporting an extra dollar of income will sharply increase the cost of insurance.  But besides earning less, there are other ways to reduce one's taxable income that should be available even to many lower-income workers.

The ACA's subsidy cliff for older buyers

The New York Times quite rightly highlights* the plight of older ACA exchange shoppers who fall over the "subsidy cliff"  -- that is, earn just enough to be ineligible for premium subsides but are subject to high premium prices because they're older.

The article's poster family is in the worst possible situation as far as the ACA is concerned: 50-something couple, two kids, no employer-based insurance, and an income just over the subsidy line. You could say they're not representative, because they're worst-placed -- but that, in a way, was the point. Winners and losers should not be separated by $1000 in annual income.

There is a serious flaw in the ACA subsidy formula. If you're young and single, subsidies taper gradually. If you're 50something, they fall to zero abruptly.  If you're fiftysomething with kids, they fall very abruptly. That's because premium prices (and thus subsidies) are higher for older adults, and subsidies (if you qualify) rise with each additional person covered by the plan. If there's three or four or five of you, and you don't qualify, you lose effectively three or four or five subsidies. It's primarily age that carves the cliff, though -- especially for two older adults.

Obama corrects an expired talking point

As Republicans have doubled and trebled down on their post-truth campaign -- asserting falsely that Obama is gutting welfare reform, gutting Medicare benefits, denigrating business owners, etc. -- Obama has persisted in one misleading talking point: that Paul Ryan proposes a Medicare voucher system that, according to a CBO estimate, could raise seniors' healthcare costs by an average of over $6000 by 2030.