Walking the crosswalk: CMS seeks to boost CSR takeup

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Let us lead you

When full enrollment data for the ACA marketplace in 2023 came out last spring, I expressed concern that the percentage of low-income enrollees forgoing strong Cost Sharing Reduction (CSR) subsidies, which are available only with silver plans, had risen to an all-time high. This in spite of the fact that since March 2021, the two cheapest silver plans in a given marketplace have been available for zero premium for enrollees with income up to 150% of the Federal Poverty Level, and for no more than 2% of income for enrollees with income in the 150-200% FPL range.

The table below shows metal level selection at the two income levels at which “strong” CSR is available in every year since 2017, the peak year for silver plan selection. (A weak version of CSR is available in the 200-250% FPL.)

CSR raises the actuarial value of a silver plan from a baseline of 70% (with no CSR) to 94% at incomes up to 150% FPL and to 87% at incomes in the 150-200% FPL range. Most low-income enrollees who forgo silver plans choose bronze plans, with an AV of 60%; a small but rising number choose gold, with AV of 80% (in about 10 states, gold plans can be cheaper than silver plans).

Virtually the only reason to pass up CSR at incomes up to 150% FPL is if the enrollee wants a more expensive insurer’s silver plan — i.e., in most cases, one with a more robust provider network — and finds it unaffordable. In June, I posited that the percentage of low-income enrollees choosing metal levels other than silver may be rising because of increasing prevalence in the ACA marketplace of ultra-narrow networks. That is, more enrollees may be forgoing CSR with eyes wide open.

Another possible cause of lower CSR takeup may be sheer confusion, as the number of plans on offer in most markets has proliferated to a ridiculous extent, only slightly trimmed back in 2024, thanks to a modest new curb on the number of plans an insurer may offer at each metal level.

In the Open Enrollment Period for 2024, officially kicking off next Wednesday (Nov. 1), we may get some clues as to the extent to which bronze selection at low incomes is due to inadvertence. For 2024, in the 32 states using the federal exchange, HealthCare.gov, CMS has undertaken* to push some low-income bronze plan enrollees into CSR silver:

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New for PY 2024, the Marketplace has updated the automatic re-enrollment process to help more consumers take advantage of cost savings. Specifically, the Marketplace will automatically re-enroll certain income-based cost-sharing reduction (CSR)-eligible enrollees who would otherwise be automatically re-enrolled in a Bronze plan into a Silver plan. This automatic re-enrollment will apply only for consumers who do not make an active plan selection on or before the deadline for January 1 coverage, and only if a Silver plan is available in the same product type, with the same provider network, and with a monthly premium after premium tax credits that is no greater than that of the Bronze plan into which they would otherwise be automatically re-enrolled.

Those in “dominated” bronze plans who log on and re-enroll actively “will see the Silver plan highlighted in the online shopping experience if they return to HealthCare.gov on or before December 15 to review their options.” So there are two layers to this effort: a cross-walk (with opt-out) for those who remain passive, and a strong nudge for those who log on and newly assess available plans.

State exchanges may implement the CSR crosswalk if they so choose. Covered California did so beginning in plan year 2022, and Massachusetts auto-enrolled some enrollees in ConnectorCare (silver plans further enhanced by supplemental state subsidies) in 2023.

How many enrollees may be affected by the CSR cross-walk?

For a silver plan premium to be “no greater than” that of the bronze plan from which the enrollee will be switched out, the silver plan must be available for zero premium, as is the case for the two cheapest silver plans in every marketplace for enrollees with income up to 150% FPL. In a few cases, the cheapest plan in a given market may be zero premium at incomes above 150% FPL, and enrollees in a bronze plan from the same insurer with the same network may be auto-switched. For the most part, however, the new policy affects enrollees with income below 150% FPL.

In 2023, of the 5.6 million OEP enrollees in HealthCare.gov states with income in the 100-150% FPL range,** 1.1 million selected bronze or gold plans. Among re-enrollees (as opposed to new enrollees) in that income range, 3.0 million enrolled actively and 1.0 million were auto re-enrolled. For the three quarters of re-enrollees who actively re-enroll, a sharp prompt will push them toward silver if a silver plan from the same insurer with the same network is available at zero premium.

In 2023, the total number of re-enrollees in HealthCare.gov states (9.2 million) was about 90% of the enrollment total for 2022 (10.3 million). We might therefore expect some million non-silver current enrollees with income under 150% FPL to re-enroll (many of them will have enrolled after OEP for 2023, as marketplace turnover is constant, and enrollment is available year-round for those with incomes up to 150% FPL). The wild card is how many of those bronze or gold plan enrollees are in plans from insurers that offered the cheapest and second-cheapest silver plans in their area — and with the same network as the bronze plan the enrollee chose.

We’ve been here before

Covered California, the largest of the state exchanges, enacted the crosswalk to CSR silver in 2022, estimating*** that 32,000 bronze plan enrollees could get a $1/month silver plan from the same insurer (no plans in CA were $0 premium at that time). I looked at the results in April 2022. Silver plan takeup at incomes below 150% FPL ticked up modestly, by about 3 percentage points from 2021 — and that in the year when silver plans became free at incomes up to 150% FPL. In California in February 2022, 16,990 subsidized enrollees out of a total of 258160 with income in the 138-150% FPL range (6.6%) selected bronze plans. In June 2021, the nearest date for which I can find a comparison, 20,270 subsidized enrollees out of 215,490 with income up from 150-200% FPL (9.4%) were enrolled in bronze. In 2023, bronze selection among the subsidized crept back up to 7.9% (19,080 out of 241,350).

At the time of that estimate, in June 2021, only about 28,000 bronze plan enrollees enrolled via Covered California (including those with income under 138% FPL) had incomes under 150% FPL. I presume the analysis found that a considerable number of the 85,550 subsidized bronze plan enrollees in the 150-200% FPL income bracket could also get a free silver plan — possible, as there has been a wide price spread between cheapest and second-cheapest silver in some California rating areas in some years. From 2021 to 2022, the percentage of subsidized enrollees in the 150-200% FPL income bracket in California who selected bronze plans dropped from 19.1% to 15.2%, and held steady in 2023 at 15.1%. Again, though, subsidized silver plan premiums dropped dramatically from 2021 to 2022, thanks to the subsidy enhancements in the American Rescue Plan Act.

Effects may be stronger in HealthCare.gov states, as a much higher percentage of enrollees have income below 150% FPL, thanks to the nonexpansion states. Also, I don’t believe that Covered California implemented the heightened prompt to choose CSR silver for those who actively re-enroll. On the other hand, Covered California’s shopping tool does “default to silver” — that is, show silver plans at the top of the list of available plans — when silver plans are available for zero premium.

Do brokers need a prompt?

When assessing the possible impact of the CSR crosswalk (and strong nudge for active enrollees), it’s important to keep in mind that most ACA marketplace enrollees do not act alone, and many enrolled in the HealthCare.gov system never look at a HealthCare.gov screen. 71% of active re-enrollees in HealthCare.gov states were assisted by brokers or nonprofit enrollment assisters in 2023, as well as 58% in California and 76% in New York. A large majority of brokers use commercial e-broker platforms (enabled for “Direct Enrollment” or “Enhanced Direct Enrollment”), not the HealthCare.gov interface. HealthSherpa, the largest e-broker, alone accounted for 35% of enrollments in the HealthCare.gov system in 2023. The e-brokers are required, however, to follow form with HealthCare.gov in the CSR crosswalk, and to provide the enhanced “nudge'“ toward silver for active re-enrollees.*** Whether a significant number of brokers need such prompts to avoid placing their clients in dominated plans is an interesting question.

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* A crosswalk to silver from dominated plans was proposed in a 2021 article by David M. Anderson, Petra W. Rasmussen and Coleman Drake.

** In the ten states that have not yet enacted the ACA Medicaid expansion (soon to be nine, as NC is expanding on Dec. 1), all of which use HealthCare.gov, eligibility for ACA marketplace subsidies begins at 100% FPL. In states that have enacted the expansion, eligibility begins at 138% FPL; below that threshold, enrollees are eligible for Medicaid. A large majority of enrollees with income below 150% FPL are in the nonexpansion states, most of them in Florida and Texas.

138,000 enrollees in HealthCare.gov states in 2023 had incomes below 100% FPL. Legally present noncitizens subject to the 5-year federal bar on Medicaid eligibility are eligible for marketplace subsidies even if their income is below 100% FPL. I have left enrollees with income below 100% FPL out of the HealthCare.gov calculations above because a fairly large percentage are subsidy-ineligible.

*** HealthSherpa, which like many platforms will foreground silver plans for user eligible for strong CSR, provides this screen for such enrollees if they opt for another metal level:

A broker briefing on OEP 2023 in the ACA marketplace

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ACA marketplace enrollment is up 13% nationally in 2023; 19% in the 33 states using the federal exchange, HealthCare.gov states; 23% in states that have not expanded Medicaid (all of which use HealthCare.gov), and 32% in Texas. Who’s buying in? In advance of the detailed enrollment data that CMS typically releases in spring, I spoke to health insurance brokers based in Texas and New Jersey.

High-income enrollees entering the marketplace

I touched base first with Dallas-area health insurance broker Jenny Hogue, president and CEO of KG Health Insurance, who had noted on Twitter in late 2021 that a number of higher-income people who had been priced out of the ACA marketplace before the American Rescue Plan Act removed the income cap on subsidy eligibility were buying in. Jenny’s perceptions were borne out by 2022 enrollment data, which showed enrollment at income over 400% FPL had more than doubled year-over-year in HealthCare.gov states, including Texas. I wanted to know if the surge was continuing this year.

Can Medicare Advantage plans lower enrollees' out-of-pocket costs? A talk with Kaiser's Juliette Cubanski

A month ago, I took a look at the resources available -- or unavailable -- to Medicaid enrollees who face a "Medicare cliff" when they turn 65 -- that is, a transition from having basically all their medical expenses covered to a program that carries a monthly premium for most of $134, requires 20% copays for most medical services and potentially huge outlays for inpatient hospital care, and has no cap on out-of-pocket costs.

Some 10.7 million Medicare enrollees are "dual eligibles" of one kind or another -- enrolled either in ABD (Aged/Blind/Disabled) Medicaid, which provides comprehensive coverage,  or in Medicare Savings Programs (MSPs), which offer more partial coverage, or in some cases both.  But the income thresholds for all of these programs are lower than for Medicaid in states that accepted the ACA expansion, and the asset tests for the MSPs are quite low -- $7560 for an individual, excluding home and car.  The application process is complex, and help and outreach are underfunded.  (For a useful overview, see Josh Schultz.)

For the many seniors of quite limited means who don't qualify for MSPs, I wondered to what extent Medicare Advantage (MA) plans might function as a de facto discount plan. About one third of current Medicare enrollees are in MA plans. MA plans usually incorporate a Part D drug plan, and often the premium is lower than the combined premium for Medicare Parts B and D (e.g., in zero-premium plans, in which enrollees pay only their Medicare Part B premium).  MA plans may offer extra benefits, such as dental, vision or hearing coverage (often quite limited). Perhaps most importantly, they cap out-of-pocket costs at a maximum of $6,700 per year. The main tradeoff is acceptance of a limited provider network -- often quite limited.

I spoke to Juliette Cubanski, Associate Director of the Program on Medicare Policy at the Kaiser Family Foundation and lead author of a recent Kaiser report on healthcare spending in Medicare households, about the appeal, real or perceived, of Medicare Advantage plans for lower income Medicare enrollees.  An edited q-and-a is below.

xpostfactoid: Does Medicare Advantage often offer effective de facto discounts over traditional Medicare?

If you're giving people a Medicaid-like provider network, do it at Medicaid-like prices

McKinsey & Co. has a report on the state of the ACA marketplace (and the whole individual market) that reinforces one dominant point that was already clear: The marketplace is relentlessly pushing insurers toward a narrow network/managed care model.

At the individual carrier level, results varied as well. While most carriers had negative margins after accounting for the 3Rs, approximately 30% of carriers achieved a positive margin in 2014. At the plan level, patterns emerge around performance differences. In the aggregate, plans based on health maintenance organizations (HMOs) had lower losses than plans based on preferred provider organizations (PPOs), consistent with their ability to enable more tightly managed benefits and care. In both 2015 and 2016, the premium increases for HMO plans were roughly half those of PPO plans, which suggests the initial results carriers experienced in the individual market were more favorable for the HMO plans.

Elisabeth Rosenthal on narrow networks in ACA marketplace: A few "yes buts"

On the front page of today's New York Times Sunday Review, Elisabeth Rosenthal, author of the incomparable Paying Till it Hurts series on the dysfunctions of our price-gouging healthcare system, spotlights the limitations of ACA marketplace plans, starting with narrow networks. It's accurate and fair, acknowledging the good that the law has done. Nonetheless I have some caveats:

1. Rosenthal compares marketplace plans' narrow networks unfavorably with the more robust networks typically offered by employer-sponsored insurance:

For UHC, what's the matter with Iowa?

This week, health insurance Centene announced that it is meeting its profit targets in the ACA marketplace. That's in marked contrast to United Healthcare, which expects to have lost a billion dollars in the marketplace by year's end -- and is withdrawing most of its offerings there in 2017.

I've previously noted that Centene is primarily a managed Medicaid company and has acted like one in the marketplace, fielding plans with low premiums, high deductibles and narrow networks. UHC, the nation's largest provider of employer-sponsored plans, put up more robust networks at higher prices in large markets.

While the contrast seems clean, there's more to the story. UHC is also a major managed Medicaid provider, and in many smaller markets its plans are price competitive.  That's the case in most of Iowa, from whence it is nonetheless withdrawing. In a post on healthinsurance.org, I examine why that might be -- and wonder why, more broadly, UHC is withdrawing most of its marketplace offerings, instead of replicating the low-cost narrow network model.

My healthcare credo to date

As an amateur healthcare student, every now and then I like to pause and take stock of the convictions I've picked up by osmosis -- by deciding, consciously and unconsciously, what (and whom) to credit in what I read and hear. Here's a short set of hypotheses (and suspicions).

1. The single most important means of healthcare cost control is uniform or at least coordinated pricing: single payer, all-payer, or, maybe in the U.S., private as a fixed percentage of public. The U.S.'s  unique every-payer-for-itself system is the main reason Americans pay far more per procedure than citizens of any other developed country.

2. The evils of market consolidation are likely to outstrip the virtues of coordinated care.

3. Which treatments and drugs are covered by insurance, and to what level (ideally by all payers in concert, and. by Medicare and Medicaid in our current system) should be informed by outcomes research and price/benefit calculations.

4. The wisest words ever spoken by a public health official: "We cover everybody, but not everything."*

Cheap and narrow Molina gains market share in Covered California

Yesterday, Covered California released some selected health insurers' sales data. The press release emphasized the fact that insurers that cut their prices in 2016 gained market share. 

As I've been tracking the offerings performance of Medicaid managed care providers (MCOs) that are selling on the ACA exchanges, I was interested in the snippets about Molina, an MCO that fields narrow networks on the exchanges and probably pays providers something close to Medicaid rates. Here's what CoveredCA had to say about Molina in CA in 2016:

Molina Healthcare lowered its rates for 2016 and ended up enrolling more than 50,000 new consumers during open enrollment, which, when added to the more than 37,000 who selected Molina in renewal, means it has more than 88,000 enrolled, the fifth-largest total statewide...

United Healthcare is a major MCO, but its large-market ACA plans don't reflect that

In the ACA marketplace, insurers whose core business has been Medicaid managed care, most notably Centene and Molina, have increasingly underpriced the competition in markets where they compete. These insurers field narrow networks and probably pay little more than Medicaid rates to providers.

United Healthcare, the nation's largest health insurer, has made waves by reporting large losses in the ACA marketplace and threatening to withdraw from it.  Yesterday Richard Mayhew posited that UHC's complaints mainly reflect the extent to which the giant has gotten its clock cleaned in the marketplace -- offering more extensive networks than competitors, charging much higher rates in many key markets, and thereby likely attracting sicker enrollees who place a premium on provider choices.

Mayhew's main source is an Urban Institute analysis of 2016 rates, mainly focused on 81 ACA rating regions that account for 47% of the country's population. Urban's John Holahan and Linda Blumberg found that in 2015, UHC sold plans in 36 of those 81 regions, but offered the cheapest or second-cheapest silver plan in only eight of them. In 2016, UHC is in 48 regions, and offers cheapest or second-cheapest (benchmark) silver in just 15 of them.

In marked contrast, Medicaid managed care providers, led by Centene (fielding the Ambetter brand) and Molina, are playing in 48 of the 81 regions this year and offering cheapest or second-cheapest silver in 44 of them. That up up from 36 out of 44 in 2015.

ACA marketplace: What to watch for in 2016

Larry Levitt tweets core questions for the ACA private market in the coming year:

Key things to watch in health for 2016: 1. Health spending trend. 2. ACA premiums for 2017. 3. Further progress in covering the uninsured.

— Larry Levitt (@larry_levitt) December 31, 2015

That is, will marketplace plans prove affordable to a critical mass of people for whom the nongroup market is the only route to insurance? (The first question has a wider purview.) Regarding the viability of the marketplace, some further questions:

1) Whither narrow networks? For 2017, CMS has tightened the standards for network adequacy, inspiring intense squawking from the insurance industry. More constraint on insurers' ability to exclude expensive providers could put some upward pressure on providers. On the other hand...

Narrow networks: a crooked path to affordable healthcare?

Richard Mayhew has a post suggesting that even a strong public option in the ACA exchanges would generate only "marginal pressure to reduce prices." In a competitive market, it might not undersell all commercial plans, and in a non-competitive market it might be able to field only a very narrow network -- most providers wouldn't opt in. Be that as it may, one claim brought me up short:

Mayhew Insurance is in a competitive market region for the Exchanges.  The lowest priced Silver plans offered by all of the insurers in this region are narrow network HMOs where the providers get paid Medicare rates plus 5% to Medicare plus 10%.  The public option would be just another plan that is in the cluster for the 2nd Silver subsidy point.

In other words, there are insurers on the exchanges who are paying providers no more than a strong public option would pay. In fact it's been suggested to me that the lowest-priced insurers in the marketplace probably pay something closer to Medicaid rates than to Medicare.

This is one of those scratchpad posts, put up as I explore further. If you see any faulty assumptions, please let me know.

Narrow networks: a painful of tourniquet on a bleeding healthcare system

Stories of bad buyer experiences with ACA exchange plans often induce me to push back a bit. I can't do that with Elisabeth Rosenthal's laser strike on patients' troubles with ACA plans' narrow networks and mazes of separate copays and coninsurance for different procedures.  Rosenthal is too nuanced, too thorough with context, and too precise in her accounts of buyers' experiences to quibble with. A sampling:

Alison Chavez, 36, who is self-employed, signed up for a marketplace plan in October 2013 that she hoped would be an improvement on her previous plan. She had recently been given a diagnosis of breast cancer and was just beginning therapy, so she was careful to choose a policy on the Covered California marketplace that included her physicians.

But in March, while in the middle of treatment, she was notified that several of her doctors and the hospital were leaving the plan’s network. She was forced to postpone a surgery as she scrambled to buy a new commercial policy that included her doctors. “I’ve been through hell and back, but I came out alive and kicking (just broke),” she wrote in an email

Michael Leavitt on State-level healthcare reform

Beneath the furious passions aroused by the Affordable Care Act lurk broad areas of bipartisan consensus regarding healthcare reform in the United States. Lawmakers in both parties want to move payment for healthcare away from fee-for-service and toward managed care, "bundled" payment by the patient or treatment episode, and risk-based payment, in which providers are rewarded for keeping costs under target and penalized for exceeding it. Both parties also accept the premise that high deductibles and co-pays help control costs -- with lip service at least usually paid to giving patients viable choices by providing information about providers' pricing and quality.

The bipartisan zone is mapped out in a report produced under the auspices of the University of Virginia's Miller Center by a commission co-chaired by Michael Leavitt, former Republican Governor of Utah and Secretary of Health and Human Services under George W. Bush, and Bill Ritter, former Democratic governor of Colorado. Cracking the Code on Healthcare Costs, released in January 2014, focuses on the role of state governments in containing healthcare costs while improving delivery, emphasizing that states have powerful levers on both fronts.  Those levers include administration of Medicaid, state employee health programs, and the state health exchanges established by the ACA, as well as the state regulation of insurance mandated by US law and "state laws affecting market competition and consumer choice, such as antitrust enforcement and requirements for providers to report price and quality information."

The report's working assumption is that, Republican cries of "federal takeover of healthcare" notwithstanding, both the ACA and existing Medicaid rules afford governors and state legislators and administrators ample scope to shape the healthcare markets in their states. Key recommendations include setting annual overall state spending benchmarks, as Massachusetts has done; promoting "coordinated, risk-based care to the disabled and dual-eligible population" -- the most expensive Medicaid beneficiaries; and also promoting coordinated, risk-based plans in the ACA exchanges -- as well as pricing transparency and quality ratings for participating plans.

ACA is here to stay

Does the ACA significantly constrain state innovation, or encourage it? I spoke about current and potential state efforts to transform healthcare delivery with Michael Leavitt and with Professor Raymond Sheppach, project director for Cracking the Code, whose comments I'll relay in a followup post.

Is there a hole in the heart of U.S. healthcare cost control?

It's a given that the sine qua non of providing universal access to quality healthcare is effective cost control. That's especially true in the United States, where healthcare costs 50% more per capita than in the next most expensive country, Switzerland, and more than twice the OECD average, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. is the only wealthy country that does not insure all its citizens.

This high-cost starting point is the Affordable Care Act's pre-existing condition, the reality underlying bitter complaints about high premiums for the unsubsidized and narrow networks in exchange plans.  As Yogi Berra might say: if you want to make healthcare affordable to all, healthcare has to be affordable. To be successful, the ACA has to bend the cost curve -- or at least, maintain the windfall spending growth slowdown that seems to have taken hold over the last ten years -- at the same time it's expanding access.

The ACA's main efforts to control costs fall broadly into two categories. First, in Medicare payments, a series of pilot programs seek to move healthcare providers away from fee-for-service, via per-patient and per-episode payments and incentives to reduce costs and meet quality benchmarks. Second, in the exchanges, competition and price pressure induce insurers to reduce costs by a) putting a good deal of the cost burden on patients, via high deductibles and co-insurance payments, and b) offering narrow networks -- that is, limiting covered doctors and hospitals to those who meet the insurer's price (and, theoretically, quality) demands. In the broad category of putting price pressure on payers of all kinds also belongs the ACA's excise tax on the most expensive employer-sponsored plans, which is driving employers too toward both narrow networks and more cost-shifting to employees.

Cost control without cost controls?

Atul Gawande has expressed the hope that by seeding myriad experiments, the ACA will grow a few cost-saving sequoias  -- as an analogous outpouring of experiments and demonstration projects spurred by the U.S. Department of Agriculture revolutionized food production and drove down food prices in the early 20th Century.

I hope Gawande is right. He may be. But it might also be argued that all this experimentation is "designing around" the one cost control element that works in every other wealthy and is lacking in the U.S.: uniform pricing per procedure, imposed or at least overseen by government. (It's "overseen" in Switzerland, where hospital rates in each canton are negotiated by hospitals and insurers acting collectively, subject to approval by the cantonal government. Physicians are paid on a national fee-for-service scale.) Without that core shift in leverage away from healthcare providers, reforms are balkanized and incentives may fly in various directions.

Tell me your ACA-shopping story

Always fair-minded, Jonathan Cohn pauses in his celebration of lower-than-forecast ACA premiums (as highlighted by the latest CBO update) to acknowledge:

In the transition from the old system, in which insurers could charge higher prices to the sick or avoid them altogether, to a new system, in which everybody pays the same price regardless of pre-existing condition, some young and healthy people must now pay more for their individual policies

The "and" in "young and healthy" is interesting, because, as the conjunction suggests if you look twice, it's not just the young who are paying more under ACA rules. Some if not most healthy older buyers who were in the individual market in 2013 are now paying more -- that is, if no one sharing the insurance has a preexisting condition.*

If you're in the individual market and you're paying more for your insurance in 2014 than you did in 2013, I'd like to speak to you (or, for that matter, if you're unsubsidized and paying less or about the same).  I'd like some detail about what your prior policy covered vs. what your current one does -- what were the tradeoffs. (I wrote up two such stories last month, and I'd like to do more.)

Between Scylla and Charybdis in a hospital bed

The Commonwealth Fund is out with a report*suggesting that the ACA has the potential to reduce the substantial ranks of the nation's underinsured -- those who currently either spend a percentage of their incomes on premiums deemed unaffordable by ACA formulas or who are exposed to out-of-pocket medical expenses high enough to deter them from getting needed care. Jonathan Cohn overviews the core conclusions here.

While affirming that ACA benefits are well-targeted at those likeliest to be underinsured, the report also highlights ways in which the ACA's Qualified Health Plans  (QHPs) may also underinsure -- chiefly via the high deductibles and out-of-pocket cost limits prevalent in bronze plans, selected thus far by 19% of QHP buyers. That much was not news to me. But then the report flagged another underinsurance hazard that brought me up short -- and brought a memory flash. My emphasis below:

When a 30 year-old's health insurance decision was a matter of life or death

Yesterday the Atlantic ran an article of mine about the ACA's satisfied unsubsidized -- those who earn too much to qualify for ACA subsidies but were happy with the insurance they found for 2014 under ACA rules because they or a family member have a pre-existing condition.

The original draft was cut down quite a bit, necessarily and appropriately for a general interest publication. Personally, though, I find the full stories of how these "health insurance veterans" navigated the individual market over the course of a decade or two fascinating. One outtake is below; I'll put up another tomorrow.

An individual market vet prefers PPOs

Frank, 40, a film producer, and his wife Sharon, also 40, a film editor, live and work in Los Angeles, among the legions of independent contractors in the film industry. The couple has a 5 year-old son. Sharon has a preexisting condition -- she was diagnosed with thyroid cancer in 2003, which was fortunately caught early and treated successfully.  Intuition and prudence probably saved Sharon's life, as well as the couple's finances. Frank's recollection of the way two young professionals navigated a world in which health insurance was not a given provides a window into the problems the ACA is designed to address.

"At that time, we usually didn't get health insurance," Frank recalls, "but Sharon was working on a program that did provide insurance.  The job ended, and she was going to move on to another thing, and was like, you know, 'I am going to pay for the COBRA and continue my health insurance.' She felt there was something wrong with her neck.  I remember thinking, you don't really have to do that. I didn't have health insurance. I had left where I was and was trying to do some writing, and my attitude was, 'we don't have the money.' She said, 'I really think it's important.'  And she was dead on the money, because she had thyroid cancer.  She was lucky, it wasn't terribly severe, she caught it pretty early, but it took some time -- she had to have three separate surgeries."

The ACA's pre-existing condition

Ezra Klein is that rare interviewer whose questions are determined almost as much by what his interlocutor just said as by what he's got planned.  That often includes teasing out real or apparent contradictions between two statements in the interview. So it was in this exchange between Klein and healthcare consultant/ACA critic Robert Laszewski:

K: That brings up two issues. The first is the individual mandate, which begins this year but is a much bigger penalty in year two, and then even bigger in year three. So one question here is how well that works.

RL: I have an interesting answer for that. I think the mandate is almost worthless because the word is getting around that they can’t really collect it. And by year three, it’s really a lot of money. I think there’ll be real pressure to just get rid of it. I don’t think you can force people to buy this insurance. If they don’t want it there’ll be a political groundswell to get rid of it. So in my mind the individual mandate is kind of irrelevant to this.

Writhing out of narrow networks in a medical seller's market

In a recent post, I voiced some unease about the "narrow networks" offered by a majority of plans on the ACA exchanges. According to a McKinsey study cited by the WSJ, 70% of silver plans are "ultranarrow" (offering access to five or fewer hospitals) or "narrow" (offering access to thirteen or fewer hospitals). Doctor rosters are similarly trimmed.  These networks reflect insurers' relative lack of pricing power versus providers.  As Ezra Klein highlights in a column spotlighting the missing link in U.S. healthcare reform, "It’s health-care providers -- not insurers -- who have too much power in the U.S. system."  That's because the U.S. is the only wealthy country in which government does not effectively set prices.

Insurers are thus retailing overly expensive care.  You can't blame them for trying to cut out the most expensive providers in our most-expensive-in-the-world market.  In that prior post, I highlighted one alternative that many employer-sponsored (or funded) plans provide:

A country struggling to share too-high healthcare costs

Jonathan Cohn today posted a roundup of eight health care experts' prognoses for the Affordable Care Act. Among them is Sean Parnell, author of the book and blog The Self-Pay Patient, information sources for those forced to pay all or most or a good portion of their medical expenses out of pocket. Regardless of whether the ACA "succeeds" or "fails," this part of Parnell's forecast is a near-certainty and worth noting:

There will be more Americans who pay directly for more of their health care. The ACA is projected by the Congressional Budget Office to leave 30 million people uninsured, and tens of millions more will get high-deductible plans through exchanges or their employers. These self-pay patients will demand price transparency and discounts for paying in full at the time of treatment, and innovative entrepreneurs will step up to cater to them while ignoring the traditional third-party payment system.

Many have pointed out the irony of Republicans excoriating the ACA for offering high-deductible plans, which conservatives have long touted as a means to promote patient responsibility and cost control. Some reforms intended to make patients weigh costs could be effective if they include the information required to make an informed choice -- e.g., incentives to choose providers with high performance ratings and transparent pricing -- or reference pricing, where the use of a plan-preferred specialist is fully covered, while patients pay the difference if they want a more expensive provider.