Friday, October 10, 2025

An extra hit to ACA marketplace premiums for the subsidy-eligible

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Rub it in, CMS

As I noted in my last post: Exacerbating the huge increase in premiums that subsidized ACA marketplace enrollees will face in 2026 if the enhanced subsidies funded through 2025 are not extended, Trump’s CMS finalized a rule change in June 2025 that increases net-of-subsidy premiums by changing the method by which health insurance premium growth is calculated. The question is by how much, and I now have an answer.

Wednesday, October 01, 2025

Why did KFF radically increase its estimate of rising costs for ACA marketplace enrollees?

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CMS takes a knife to premium subsidies

Update, 10/10: See the next post for an update as to the degree to which the CMS rule change discussed below will reduce premiums if the enhanced subsidies are not extended.

Yesterday KFF updated its estimate of the degree to which the average ACA marketplace enrollee’s premiums will rise in 2026 if the enhanced premium subsidies (created in 2021 and funded only through 2025) are allowed to expire. KFF’s widely-cited initial estimate, calculated in July 2024, was 75% for enrollees subsidized in 2025 (some of whom will lose subsidy eligibility). The new estimate for currently subsidized enrollees is 114%, with the average annual premium rising from $888 to $1,904. The increases are especially onerous for those who become newly subsidy-ineligible, as the old income cap on subsidies will snap back in place.

(Note: the enhanced subsidy schedule was created the by the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) in 2021 and extended through 2025 by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. Below, we’ll refer to the enhanced subsidies as the ARPA subsidies.)

KFF cites two reasons for the increased estimate:

  • Insurers’ rate requests for base premiums for this year are up an average of 18% by KFF’s calculations, which was obviously not known in July 2024. That increase directly affects unsubsidized enrollees, including the newly unsubsidized. Unsubsidized enrollees comprised just 8% of on-exchange enrollees in 2025 but will likely account for nearly 20% of (diminished) enrollment if the ARPA subsidies expire. The KFF estimate includes enrollees who are subsidized in 2025 but would not be in 2026 if the ARPA subsidies expire - i.e., many of those with income over 400% FPL ($62,600 for an individual, $84,600 for a couple).

  • The “applicable percentages” of income that subsidized enrollees will pay in 2026 (varying in each income bracket) are considerably higher than the percentages KFF used in its 2024 estimate. As most enrollees are subsidized, and so not directly harmed by base premium increases (and are in fact sometimes helped by increases in base premiums, as discussed below), this underestimate of the percentages of income to be paid for benchmark silver plan in each income bracket is likely the main driver of the increase in KFF’s estimate.

As I noted back in August, KFF’s underestimate of the projected increase in subsidized enrollees’ premiums in 2026 became apparent in July when the IRS published the actual subsidy schedule for 2026 (assuming the enhanced subsidies are not renewed). As I also noted, the surprisingly large difference between the KFF estimate and the actual “applicable percentages” of income to be paid by enrollees is due to some degree to a rule change enacted by Trump’s CMS, which changed the method by which an inflation adjustment in the applicable percentages is calculated. Reverting to the method the Trump administration had put in place for OEP 2020, a change the Biden administration reversed before OEP 2022, CMS included individual market premiums in its calculation of inflation in health insurance premiums since 2013. The large marketplace premium spikes of 2017 and 2018 (average benchmark premiums rose 61% from 2016-2018) still add significantly to the premium growth calculation.

My question now: how much worse did that rule change make the increase for subsidized enrollees in 2026?


The “applicable percentages” that KFF used in its 2024 estimate of enrollees’ premiums for 2024 were taken from a CBO calculation of what the subsidy schedule in 2025 would have looked like if the enhanced subsides were not in place. Every year (pre-ARPA), an adjustment to the applicable percentages was derived from a calculation of inflation in health insurance premiums divided by wage growth (the Premium Growth over Income Growth Index). When the index was below 1.0, applicable percentages would drop in the year to come; below the baseline percentages established for the first ACA plan year, 2014; when it was above 1.0, the applicable percentages would rise above the 2014 baseline. As that index (let’s call it PGIGI) is also used to calculate growth in maximum allowable out-of-pocket costs in marketplace plans, as well as the Required Contribution Percentage (don’t ask, or rather see note below), it continued to be calculated and published in the ARPA era.

In its July 2024 estimate (still widely cited until yesterday), KFF used a subsidy schedule for 2026 that CBO had derived from the PGIGI for 2025, published in a June 2024 letter to Congressional leaders who had inquired about the cost of extending the ARPA subsidies. That was I believe the lowest PGIGI ever - 0.910, and it led to the lowest applicable percentages ever.

The PGIGI for 2026 published by the CMS under Biden in October 2024 was 0.962 — again, quite low. Under Trump, as noted above, CMS changed the calculation by adding individual market premium growth to the health insurance side of the equation. That boosted the PGIGI to 1.006 — 4.6% higher than under the initial calculation, and more than 10% higher than PGIGI underlying the KFF estimate (see pdf p. 97 here). The method change in the PGIGI calculation accounts for almost half of the difference between KFF’s initial calculations and actual premiums for subsidized enrollees. Update/correction, 10/10/25: the “almost half” estimate is incorrect — or rather, it’s correct for the increase in MOOP triggered by the method change (from $10,150 under the Biden administration’s initial PGIGI to $10,600 after the rule change) but incorrect as to the change in the subsidy schedule. That’s because when the IRS published the 2026 subsidy schedule in July, it accessed newly updated National Health Expenditure (NHE) spending projections, which did increase the PGIGI and applicable percentages but narrowed the gap between what the PGIGI would have been under the previous method and what was operative after the Trump administration’s rule change. The rule change boosted applicable percentages by about 17%, not 45%. Apparently the new projections increased the forecast of growth in employer-sponsored insurance more than in individual market. I will explain this in my next post.

From my prior post, here is a) the difference between the subsidy schedule KFF used in its 2024 estimate and the actual subsidy schedule for 2026, and b) the resulting difference in net-of-subsidy benchmark premiums in 2026.

Percentage of income required to purchase a benchmark silver plan at different income levels in Plan Year 2026: Actual vs. KFF/CBO 2024 estimate

Sources: IRS, KFF, CBO.

Monthly net-of-subsidy premium for benchmark silver plan in 2026 if ARPA subsidy enhancements expire: 2024 KFF/CBO estimate vs. actual applicable percentage

Single adult, any age. FPL for 2025 (applies to PY 2026)
The “Actual” column is now reflected in the updated
KFF subsidy calculator

For a sense of scale as to the impact of the PGIGI method change, it raised the highest allowable annual out-of-pocket maximum from $10,150 to $10,600, an increase of 4.4%. Net-of-subsidy premiums in each income bracket are about 15% higher in actuality than in the 2024 KFF estimates and almost half [about 17% - see correction above] of that difference is attributable to CMS’s decision to incorporate the individual market in the PGIGI calculation.

For a record of how applicable percentages changed year by year, along with a detailed account of how they’re calculated, see Louise Norris.

Mitigating factors

As briefly noted above, increases in base premiums can actually be a boon to subsidized enrollees. Since subsidized enrollees pay a fixed percentage of income for the benchmark (second cheapest) silver plan, when premiums rise, subsidies rise, as do “spreads” between the benchmark and other plans. That makes plans that cost less than than the benchmark cheaper for subsidized enrollees. Those plans include a) the cheapest silver plan (usually only marginally cheaper than the benchmark), b) most bronze plans, and c) in about 15 states where strict silver loading is mandated or practiced by insurers, gold plans. In advance of OEP 2026, three states — Illinois, Arkansas and Washington — have newly mandated strict silver loading. (Very briefly: Cost Sharing Reduction (CSR), which attaches only to silver plans and is available only for enrollees with income up to 250% FPL, raises silver plans to a roughly platinum level for most silver plan enrollees. On average, then, silver plans have a higher actuarial value than gold and so “should” cost more, but usually don’t. Before October 2017, insurers were reimbursed separately for the value of CSR, but at that point Trump cut off the payments, which led to CSR being priced into premiums. Some states have used various means to mandate that gold plans be priced below silver to varying degrees.)

Another mitigating factor is inflation in the Federal Poverty Level, which rose 3.3% from $15,060 in 2024 to $15,560 in 2025 (in the marketplace, the prior-year FPL is operative). An enrollee whose income remains static gets a small subsidy boost by having a lower FPL (or potentially a large one, if the change puts her below a CSR threshold).

Below are the calculations showing the PGIGI for 2025 (the basis for the subsidy schedule for 2026 that KFF used in its 2024 estimate), for 2026 as set by the Biden administration, and for 2026 as finalized by Trump’s CMS.

  1. 2025 (underlying subsidy schedule used by KFF) (pg. 6)

  2. 2026 - Biden admin. (p. 6)

  3. 2026 - Trump admin. (pdf p. 97)

    - - - —

* The Required Contribution Percentage is the percentage of income above which an individual is exempt from the individual mandate if the cheapest ACA-compliant plan is above that threshold. Though the Republican Congress reduced the mandate penalty to $0 in December 2017, the calculation is still made each each year because the same threshold qualifies enrollees over age 30 to purchase a catastrophic plan (which CMS recently made available to anyone who doesn’t qualify for premium subsidies).

Correction: Initially I wrote as if KFF’s cost increase estimate included all enrollees, subsidized and unsubsidized. In fact it’s based on what will happen to currently subsidized enrollees only — including those who become subsidy ineligible if the ARPA subsidies expire. I’ve adjusted language in the early paragraphs accordingly.

Update/correction, 10/10/25 (in case you missed it in the text above): the assertion that “almost half” of the PGIGI estimate is due to the method change is incorrect — or rather, it’s correct for the increase in MOOP triggered by the method change (from $10,150 under the Biden administration’s initial PGIGI to $10,600 after the rule change) but incorrect as to the change in the subsidy schedule. That’s because when the IRS published the 2026 subsidy schedule in July, it accessed newly updated National Health Expenditure (NHE) spending projections, which did increase the PGIGI and applicable percentages but narrowed the gap between what the PGIGI would have been under the previous method and what was operative after the Trump administration’s rule change. The rule change boosted applicable percentages by about 17%, not 45%. Apparently the new projections increased the forecast of growth in employer-sponsored insurance more than in individual market. I will explain this in my next post.

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Image credit: Michael Coghlan from Adelaide, Australia, CC BY-SA 2.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0>, via Wikimedia Commons

Tuesday, September 23, 2025

Occam's razor suggests a short-term extension of ARPA-enhanced subsidies for Obamacare

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Back in July, a memo by Trump pollster Fabrizio Ward famously forecast that refusing to extend the enhanced ACA premium subsidies established by the American Rescue Plan Act, currently funded only through 2025, would cost Republicans the House of Representatives in 2026. More than 80% of the general public supported extended the enhanced subsidies, Ward claimed. Failing to extend them would increase a generic Republican’s then-current polling deficit among motivated voters in the midterms from -8% to -15%. Extending them would swing the generic ballot to +6% among motivated voters.

Underlying that calculation are the huge premium increases that will hit the 22 million current ACA marketplace enrollees (or their 2026 prospective replacements) if the ARPA enhanced subsidies expire. According to an oft-cited KFF estimate, ARPA subsidy expiration would lead to an average increase of 75%* in premiums paid by marketplace enrollees — an average that rolls together reduced subsidies for those eligible, complete loss of subsidies for enrollees with income above the pre-ARPA income cap on subsidy eligibility, and average base (unsubsidized) premium increases a bit below or a bit above 20% (the higher estimate, by Charles Gaba, is weighted according to plans’ enrollment).

Wednesday, August 13, 2025

Worse than forecast: Pending cost increases for ACA marketplace enrollees

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KFF data and analysis is essential to anyone seeking to understand the U.S. healthcare system. It’s copious, reliable, and clearly presented. But inevitably, it’s not always up to date.

In late 2024, KFF posted a calculator estimating how much more ACA marketplace enrollees at any income, income and family size would pay for coverage in 2026 if the subsidy enhancements created by the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) are allowed to expire (they are funded only through 2025). If the ARPA subsidy schedule expires, which appears near-certain at this point, the subsidy schedule will revert to the pre-ARPA formula used through OEP 2021, adjusted by an annual inflation factor.

When the calculator was created, the subsidy schedule for 2026 was unpublished, and KFF used estimates created by CBO and the JCT in June 2024 (see p. 9 here). Last month, the IRS published the subsidy schedule for 2026, and the CBO estimates turn out to have been quite low. At higher incomes, the actual percentage of income required to buy the benchmark (second cheapest silver) plan is more than a full percentage point higher than CBO estimated (e.g., 9.96% of income at an income of 300% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) vs. the CBO estimate of 8.65%).

Percentage of income required to purchase a benchmark silver plan at different income levels in Plan Year 2026: Actual vs. KFF/CBO 2024 estimate

Sources: IRS, KFF, CBO. See note at bottom for the ARPA enhanced subsidy schedule.

Monday, August 04, 2025

In Texas Obamacare, a gold patch on the loss of enhanced subsidies

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CMS to Texas: Who told you to put the balm on?

 As expiration of the enhanced ACA premium subsidies created by the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) at the start of Plan Year 2026 looms, it’s worth considering the extent to which strict silver loading may mitigate the sharp premium increases resulting from reversion to the ACA’s original subsidy schedule. Here we’ll take a look at how a market in which gold plans are priced way below silver in 2025 is likely to play out in 2026.

Thursday, July 24, 2025

20 attorneys general sue to keep health centers, Head Start and other programs open to all

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Hey kids -- what's your immigration status?

20 state attorneys general (including DC’s) have sued the Dept. of Justice, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Dept. of Education and Dept. of Labor seeking to void a series of orders issued in mid-July that abruptly ended a host of social programs’ exemptions from a federal ban on serving broad categories of immigrants, both lawfully present and undocumented. The ban was established by the so-called Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), enacted in 1996.

The complaint documents that programs decreed this month to have suddenly lost their exemption from PRWORA’s limiting of benefit eligibility to citizens and “qualified aliens” have been excepted based on rules put in place as soon as PRWORA was enacted in 1996. Many exempted programs, such as the community health center, drug treatment, and Head Start programs, are premised on not checking beneficiaries’ immigration status, and some (e.g., the CHCs) are required by statute not to check immigration status. 

Wednesday, July 16, 2025

Trump admin newly excludes many immigrants from a host of benefits

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CHC in Davenport, Iowa

Over the weekend, I learned third-hand that employees at a network of Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) in New Jersey had been told by management that the feds had forbidden them to treat undocumented immigrants.

That conclusion may be somewhat premature, but it’s grounded in abrupt and sweeping administrative action. In its latest barbaric assault on immigrants, the Trump administration has issued a series of orders banning access to most of the narrow range of federally funded benefits and programs not already off-limits to the undocumented - or to the many categories of lawfully present immigrants who are not “qualified aliens” (i.e., green card card holders, refugees, asylees and a few other categories*).

On July 10, three federal agencies — HHS, DOL and Education — issued notices (here is HHS’s) cutting off access for most non-green-card-holding immigrants to various benefits and services that had been excepted from a sweeping ban established in 1996. HHS’s list of benefits that will lose excepted status is as follows: 

Thursday, July 10, 2025

Mitigating the Medicaid cuts

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Look for the helpers

The enactment of the Republicans’ monstrous budget bill in one sense sets politics and policy at odds, at least for Democrats. Annie Karni, congressional report for The New York Times, frames a political problem for Dems:

A challenge for Ds who expect the passage of this bill to help them win elections is that it may take a while for people to feel the full negative effects. Rs front loaded some temporary tax cuts for working people and backloaded cuts to Medicaid to hit after the midterms.

As KFF’s Larry Levitt points out in response, funding cuts and some impediments to enrollment in the ACA’s private-plan marketplace kick in immediately or almost immediately, i.e., for OEP 2026, beginning Nov. 1 this year (and Charles Gaba has tallied provisions in both Medicaid and marketplace that will take effect before the midterms). That said, Republicans will of course exploit the time lag, which extends to other benefit cuts as well (SNAP, student loans, energy credits), using it to add plausibility to their claims that, as MAGA go-along Tom Kean Jr. (NJ-7) boasted, “we protected Medicaid for every intended beneficiary in New Jersey and across the country.” That is, the bill does not change Medicaid eligibility for anyone (except various classes of lawfully present noncitizens, who are just human waste in Republican parlance). Instead, Republicans set up a thicket of administrative enrollment impediments and cuts to state funding (mostly delayed) that will increase the uninsured population by some 12 million by CBO’s estimate (with another 4 million losing coverage due to Republicans’ refusal to extend the enhanced ACA marketplace subsidies funded through 2025*). If enrollment reductions on that scale don’t happen — as many Republicans claim — neither will the cuts to federal spending that help fund the bill’s gargantuan tax cuts.

All that said, I’d like to consider Democrats’ alleged political “challenge” from the opposite end of the telescope. To what extent can Democrats in state government — and, more speculatively, in Congress — mitigate the coverage and funding losses? Administrative barriers can be erected with steel or Styrofoam — though Trump’s CMS, led by people whose chief passion in life is to ensure that someone somewhere doesn’t get a benefit to which they’re not technically entitled**— will doubtless work to insist on steel. If Democrats take the House, they may be able to delay or reduce some spending cuts — the annual ratchet-down of the provider tax safe harbor, for example, strikes me as the kind of thing Congress is prone to pause.

Friday, June 20, 2025

Republicans make the "abled-bodied" vulnerable

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Community engagement requirements for the "able-bodied"




Republican legislators who wrote the Medicaid provisions of their monstrous megabill are acting on a simple belief: low-income nonelderly adults who lack access to affordable employer-sponsored health insurance should not have access to affordable health coverage.

While their $900 billion* in cuts to federal spending on Medicaid over ten years will hurt all classes of Medicaid enrollees, the cuts are aimed primarily at low-income adults insured through the ACA Medicaid expansion — that is, adults under age 65 who are not recognized as disabled by the federal government (though many have varying degrees of disability**). Some cuts not aimed directly at the ACA expansion population target states that have enacted the expansion.

Provider tax cut aimed at expansion states

The major new spending cut added by the Senate Finance Committee to the House package last week is a case in point. Section 71120 would sharply reduce the revenue that Medicaid expansion states derive from “provider taxes,” a financial maneuver, allowed for decades, that all states except Alaska employ to boost Medicaid revenue and fund services. Under current law, states are allowed to hold taxed healthcare providers “harmless” if the taxes don’t exceed 6% of revenue — that is, they can boost payment to an amount equivalent to the revenue collected. Since the federal government pays its standard Medicaid share of the resulting new spending, varying from 50-77% by state, states can use the federal share to further boost spending. Most such taxes are imposed on nursing homes (46 states) and hospitals (45 states).

That financial maneuver is a classic American “kludge” — a workaround chronic Medicaid underfunding initiated by state governments and accepted by CMS. A responsible legislature looking to end such haphazard, convoluted funding mechanisms might replace the revenue from them, built into state budgets, with a more rational funding source. The House bill put a ban on new provider taxes, leaving current arrangements in place. The Senate Finance Committee takes a deep slice out of the revenue, cutting current taxes — but only for Medicaid expansion states. For those states, the “safe harbor” under which hospitals and other providers can be held harmless is cut by 0.5% per year from the current 6% until it hits a floor of 3.5% (nursing homes are exempted from the lower threshold).

As Georgetown’s Edwin Park notes (citing KFF data), at present 18 expansion states imposes taxes on hospitals above the 3.5% future safe harbor, and some of those states explicitly earmarked that revenue*** to fund the state’s share of the cost of enacting the ACA Medicaid expansion— potentially endangering maintenance of the expansion in those states if this provision is enacted. At the same time, six of the ten nonexpansion states (Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas) impose taxes on hospitals greater than 3.5% and would be exempt from this cut.

Monday, June 16, 2025

Republicans' hands-free healthcare cuts: Make enrollees self-deport from Medicaid and Obamacare

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Third and probably last in a series from me at nj.com. Gift link.
Why N.J.’s Republicans in Congress are OK with 16M Americans losing insurance

Thursday, June 05, 2025

Republicans poised to halve the ACA cake and eat it

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There’s a sad symmetry to the Congressional Budget Office’s final estimate of the coverage effects of the healthcare provisions in the monstrous megabill that passed the House with no Democratic votes on May 22.

In March 2011, CBO estimated that by 2021, the ACA would reduce the uninsured population by 34 million — 17 million via Medicaid, and 17 million via the subsidized ACA private-plan marketplace. (Below, note the net gain in the individual market: 24 million enrolled in the exchanges established by the ACA, minus 6 million in the off-exchange market and another 1 million in employer-sponsored plans.)

After waves of political upheaval, including a major boost to marketplace subsidies in 2021 (now apparently doomed to expire at year’s end), those estimates look pretty good. In Medicaid, 16.6 million enrollees as of June 2024 (the last available tally) were rendered eligible solely by the ACA expansion, and total Medicaid enrollment as of January 2025 is up by 22 million over the last pre-ACA total. As for the marketplace, enrollment as of the end of Open Enrollment 2025 was 24.3 million, with perhaps another 2 million off-exchange, compared to total individual market enrollment of 10.6 million pre-ACA, by KFF’s estimate.

Today, in a narrative breakdown of its estimates sent to ranking Democrats in the key House and Senate committees, CBO forecasts an increase of 16 million uninsured people triggered by the House bill coupled with Republican refusal to extend the ACA subsidy increases enacted in 2021 and funded only through 2025. Like the coverage gains triggered by the ACA, these coverage losses would split almost evenly between coverage losses triggered by the bill’s changes to Medicaid and its changes to rules governing the ACA marketplace. Here is the breakdown:

Changes to Medicaid are forecast to increase the uninsured population by 7.8 million, and changes to the ACA marketplace, by 8.2 million.

Wednesday, May 28, 2025

A multi-pronged assault on health coverage for immigrants

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You look able-bodied -- and you want health coverage?

6/4/25: See updates/corrections below regarding marketplace eligibility for immigrants subject to the 5-year bar for Medicaid eligibility, along with CBO estimates of coverage losses among immigrants in the ACA marketplace.

There is so much to lament in the healthcare provisions included in the legislative monstrosity that passed the House with no Democratic votes on May 22. By CBO’s conservative estimate, provisions affecting Medicaid and the ACA marketplace will reduce spending by about $900 billion over ten years and increase the uninsured population by about 11 million — 15 million if you count Republicans’ refusal to extend the enhanced ACA premium subsidies created by the American Rescue Plan and funded only through 2025.

Reliable scholars have detailed the likely effects of Draconian work reporting requirements and more frequent redeterminations in Medicaid, and of the miles of red tape wrapped around prospective ACA marketplace enrollees, which impose unsustainable cost and risk on many enrollees (Jonathan Cohn has just published a painfully good overview of the bill’s assault on the marketplace).

Here I want to focus on the legislative aggression unleashed on immigrants — lawfully present as well as undocumented.

Friday, May 16, 2025

With ARPA subsidies set to expire, a window on the ACA's off-exchange market

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press release from New Jersey’s Department of Banking and Insurance (DOBI) urging Congress to extend the enhanced ACA marketplace subsidies created by the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) in 2021, which are funded only through this year, led me to discover that DOBI has resumed quarterly tracking of off-exchange as well as on-exchange enrollment, after a long hiatus (1-2 years?). Reports are now available through Q2 2024.

In general, nationally, off-exchange enrollment data is spotty, and the off-exchange enrollment numbers in NJ open a window into how expiration of the ARPA-enhanced subsidies, which Republicans are unlikely to extend, may affect those with income above 400% FPL, the once and likely future cap on subsidy eligibility. In the Open Enrollment Period (OEP) for 2021, the last year with the 400% FPL cap on income eligibility, 43% of state enrollees in ACA-compliant plans were unsubsidized. In 2024, just 25% were unsubsidized. We will probably soon be back to 40%-plus.

Wednesday, May 14, 2025

Republican bill imposes major new out-of-pocket costs on the near-poor

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The draft legislation released by the House Energy and Commerce Committee on Sunday night (May 11) gnaws at Medicaid and marketplace spending from so many angles and inhibits enrollment in so many ways, it’s hard to know where the bulk of the enrollment reductions and benefit degradation will come from. By CBO’s preliminary estimate, the Medicaid and marketplace provisions will cut federal spending by $715 billion over ten years and increase the ranks of the uninsured by 13.7 million (if you include failure to extend funding for the enhanced marketplace subsidies provided by the American Rescue Plan Act, which are funded only through this year; expiration of those subsidies accounts for 4.2 million of the coverage losses).

On the Medicaid side, work requirements (a.k.a. red tape requirements) have been clearly shown to drive eligible people off the rolls without boosting employment. Work requirements may account for more than half of the 7.7 million reduction in Medicaid enrollment that CBO forecasts, based on prior Urban Institute estimates (CBO has not yet itemized its Medicaid enrollment loss estimate by provision). Increasing the frequency of redeterminations and suspension of Biden administration rules designed to streamline enrollment would also take a significant toll on enrollment.

Here I want to focus on a double-barreled assault imposing a different form of harm: increased out-of-pocket costs for those who do enroll in coverage, in particular those with income a step above poverty, i.e. 100-138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). In the 2025 ACA marketplace, which uses prior-year FPL, that’s income up to $20,783 for an individual, $43,056 for a family of four. For Medicaid, which uses current-year FPL, the thresholds are 3.9% higher. In the marketplace, we’ll also look at the broader 100-150% FPL bracket, since benchmark silver plans are available at zero premium up to 150% FPL under the enhanced subsides.

Thursday, May 08, 2025

CBO lowballs coverage losses if Republicans defund the ACA Medicaid expansion

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Cuts may be more unkinder than portrayed

As Republicans in the House and Senate continue to tussle over various options for cutting hundreds of billions of dollars in federal Medicaid spending, the Congressional Budget Office has dropped a gift for those who favor defunding the ACA Medicaid expansion.

The ACA expansion, which the Supreme Court made optional for states, opens Medicaid to adults with income below 138% of the Federal Poverty Level. To make that coverage affordable for states, the ACA established a permanent 90% Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) for those rendered eligible by the expansion. For other Medicaid eligibility categories — children, Aged, Blind and Disabled, and low-income seniors, the federal FMAP ranges by state from 50-77%, varying according to state per capita income.

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In a report released yesterday estimating the fiscal and coverage effects of five Medicaid cost-cutting options Republicans are considering,* CBO produced surprisingly low estimates of the coverage losses that would result from Republicans defunding the ACA Medicaid expansion.


Of the five cost-cutting options CMS considered,* I want to focus first and foremost on two of them:

  • Option 1 would repeal the ACA expansion’s 90% Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), paying only each state’s match rate for all other populations (ranging from 50% to 77%) for the expansion population (adults with income below 138% FPL).

  • Option 4 would impose a per-enrollee inflation cap on federal spending for the ACA expansion population alone. KFF estimates that such a “per capita cap, using the most likely inflation measure (CPI-U plus 0.4%), would ratchet the expansion FMAP down to 69% by 2034.

According to CMS’s most recent tally (June 2024), the federal government pays the 90% FMAP for 20.9 million adults rendered eligible by expansion criteria (income under 138% of the Federal Poverty Level).**

CBO estimates that repealing the expansion’s 90% FMAP outright would reduce Medicaid enrollment by 5.5 million and increase the uninsured population by 2.4 million. Imposing per capita caps on the expansion population would reduce enrollment by 3.3 million and increase the ranks of the uninsured by 1.5 million.

Those estimates assume that most states will not end eligibility for the expansion population — whether quickly, if the 90% FMAP is repealed outright, or somewhat more slowly, if it’s eroded over time by per capita caps. That’s surprising.

The estimates “do seem low,” Larry Levitt of KFF told me in an email. Matt Fiedler of the Brookings Institute agreed. “I think they are on the low side. I think I would bet on states cutting back more aggressively, although I think it’s also fair to say that there is a lot of uncertainty here.” Edwin Park of Georgetown University wrote, “CBO is likely overly conservative here because it's unlikely that states in reality would be able to replace half of the cost shift in the face of all of these cuts.”

Park’s last point is key. Explaining the basis of its estimates, CBO spells out its assumption that “on average, states would replace roughly half of the reduced funds with their own resources.”

That assumption raises expert eyebrows. By CBO’s estimate, eliminating the ACA’s 90% match rate for the expansion population would reduce federal payment to states for expansion enrollment by $860 billion over ten years. That total includes the effects of states reducing benefits and provider payments. The ten-year federal payment reduction before state response is estimated at $516 billion.

All states but Alaska are required by their Constitutions or state law to balance their budgets. By KFF’s estimate, the 40 states (plus D.C.) that have enacted the expansion collectively would have to spend $626 billion over ten years to make up the federal shortfall resulting from repeal of the ACA’s 90% FMAP. New Jersey has estimated the annual cost of FMAP to the state budget at $2.2 billion (in an annual budget of $56 billion). As anyone who’s followed any state’s annual budget deliberations can testify, states don’t raise billions in new revenue lightly. It is highly questionable whether any state would be able to maintain the expansion in its entirety at the state’s own FMAP (especially wealthy states, where the FMAP is just 50% or slightly higher). On May 1, prior to the CBO report release, Park assessed the odds as follows:

Faced with such massive cost shifts under these proposals alone [90% FMAP repeal or per capital caps for the expansion group], states would either have to dramatically raise taxes, cut other parts of their budget like education, deeply cut the rest of their Medicaid program, or as is most likely, eventually drop the expansion.

It’s possible that a handful of determined Democratic-led states would maintain the expansion for enrollees with income up to 100% FPL (as Wisconsin does at present, without the 90% FMAP), which would place those in the 100-138% FPL bracket into marketplace coverage, for which the federal government pays 100% of the cost. But those blue states are also mostly wealthy states with low FMAPs — e.g., 50% for California, New York, Illinois, and others.

Under the assumption that no state would maintain coverage to 138% FPL, enrollment declines would likely top 15 million.

In fact, 12 states have “trigger” laws requiring them to end the expansion if the expansion FMAP is reduced. While there is some ambiguity and flexibility in how some states might interpret those triggers, Georgetown’s Adam Searing notes that nine of them would all but certainly have to terminate coverage immediately if the expansion’s 90% FMAP is repealed. Should all of them do so, the Center for American Progress has tallied the enrollment losses at 3.6 million. (Subtract the three states with more flexible triggers — Idaho, Iowa and New Mexico — and the total is 3.1 million.) Under CBO’s estimate, that would suggest coverage losses in 28 non-triggered states of just 2-odd million.

It seems unlikely that losses would be that low. CBO’s estimates virtually assume that the expansion would be maintained in high-population states such as California (which has 5 million expansion enrollees), New York (2.1 million), Illinois (843,000), and Pennsylvania (832,000).

Per capita caps

Capping payments for the expansion population would ratchet down the expansion FMAP annually rather than in one fell swoop. As mentioned above, KFF estimates that the FMAP would drop to 69% over ten years — and, I would add, would continue to drop in a second decade, assuming that any policy in the U.S. remains stable for that long. Because the damage is incremental, the ten-year cost deficit reduction estimate is far lower ($225 billion vs. $710 billion) — but the ultimate effect on coverage should be more or less the same (or worse in future decades, if the caps are not removed). It’s hard to imagine states maintaining coverage to 138% FPL with an FMAP under 70%.

Other options

CBO Option 3, imposing per capita caps on federal spending for the entire Medicaid population, appears to be off the table. As to Option 5, repeal of an array of Biden administration administrative measures designed to reduce friction in the application process and churn in enrollment, I have no comment, except that this repeal would be (will be, sigh) very unfortunate. Reducing administrative barriers to enrollment is a slow boring of hard boards.

Provider tax wipeout?

Option 2, limiting state taxes on health care providers (or rather, limiting payback to those providers) bears some consideration.

Provider taxes are a financial maneuver through which states plus up their federal Medicaid contribution. If a tax on a provider class does not exceed 6% of the provider’s net revenues, the state can essentially give the tax dollars back to the provider group in the form of higher payments — and receive its federal FMAP (ranging by state from 50-77%) for the extra payments.

Right-wing Paragon Health Institute head Brain Blase, deploying Gingrichian rhetoric, calls these maneuvers “money laundering.” In fact they’re the kind of kludge that state-federal partnerships and U.S. political sclerosis routinely generate: a workaround to compensate for chronic underfinancing of Medicaid, which keeps payment rates below Medicare rates and below cost for providers in many categories and places. States must propose such arrangements to CMS before implementing them, and CMS must assess the proposal and approve it. These taxes are legal, and states depend on them.

Repealing states’ ability to hold the taxed entities harmless — that is, to essentially pay the tax back, largely with federal dollars — would be very expensive for states. CBO estimates the deficit reduction effect of complete repeal of the ‘hold harmless’ option at $668 billion over ten years — nearly the same as savings from repealing the ACA FMAP ($710 billion). The gross reduction in federal outlays is slightly higher than for ACA FMAP repeal. The coverage loss estimate also is higher — 8.8 million.

The catch is that a complete wipeout of the provider payment option is highly unlikely. A more realistic option is to reduce the threshold (“safe harbor”) under which the taxed entities can be held harmless from the current 6% of revenues. A prior CBO estimate pegs the 10-year federal savings from reducing the safe harbor threshold to 2.5% at $241 billion. There would be large variation in how this measure would affect states, as the number of provider taxes and thresholds states use varies widely.

In connection with the provider taxes, Park’s analysis of the likely effects of Republican proposals makes two important points. First, a dozen states by Park’s count fund their 10% share of the ACA expansion cost via provider taxes. “Restricting provider taxes,” Park writes, “could by itself prevent some expansion states from continuing to directly rely on this state financing source for the expansion. If such states were unable to identify other revenues, they would have no choice but to eliminate their expansion.”

Second, as the last point illustrates, any combination of cuts will have a cumulative effect. As Park put it in an email to me, “With multiple cost-shifts, it's hard to see how states can compensate for any of them in combination.” CBO perhaps had to consider the five options for which Wyden and Pallone requested analysis (see note at bottom) in isolation, because they are not part of an actual bill, and no one knows which, if any, Republicans will put into legislation. But that limitation will likely limit stakeholders’ perception of the damage these cuts may inflict as they consider CBO’s projections.

- - -

* CMS considered these five options at the request of Democrats Ron Wyden, ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee, and Frank Pallone, ranking member of the House Energy & Commerce Committee.

** Of those, 4.3 million would have been eligible under pre-ACA eligibility criteria in a handful of states that obtained waivers to expand coverage, with the largest numbers in New York (1.8 million, Puerto Rico (634,000), Massachusetts (393,000) and Louisiana (216,000).

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