To whose advantage is Medicare Advantage? Part 1

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Note: Enrollment in Medicare Advantage plans is poised to surpass enrollment in traditional, fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare in 2023. MA's rapid growth raises major questions about the shape of Medicare coverage going forward. This is the first of two posts examining the pros and cons of Medicare Advantage. This post outlines the major issues as framed by MedPAC and select researchers, along with the basic economic tradeoffs for enrollees. Part 2 will report the experience of a hospitalist, brokers, and various stakeholders who responded to a CMS request for feedback about the MA program.

There is a slipknot quality to attempts to compare the value and utility of traditional, fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare and Medicare Advantage.

Medicare Advantage plans generally place bids to CMS far below CMS benchmarks, which are based on an adjusted estimate of what it costs to provide FFS Medicare to enrollees in the plan's geographic area. On average, according to the 2022 MedPAC report, MA plans spend 15% less to provide Part A and B benefits than FFS Medicare would spend.  But CMS pays Medicare Advantage plans an average of 104% of what it would pay for FFS Medicare coverage for the same enrollees. But MA plans use the excess payment to provide an estimated $2,000 per member in surplus benefits or out-of-pocket cost relief. But, according to MedPAC, the value of MA-furnished extra services as actually used by enrollees is elusive, because of inadequate reporting requirements, and the quality ratings that increase payments to MA plans do a poor job measuring quality.

With regard to outcomes, MA plans employ treatment protocols that do minimize some so-called low-value care and, in some cases at least, boost usage of preventive care that, according to some studies, can reduce cardiac events, foot amputations for diabetics, ER trips, hospital admittances, and other conditions and services. But there is also good evidence that MA plans inhibit or impede access to needed or high-value care, introduce expensive and sometimes dangerous bureaucratic hurdles to obtaining needed care, and drive enrollees with intense medical needs back to FFS. 

Most notoriously, by multiple accounts, MA plans often impede, block, limit options and reduce the duration of post-acute care. Comments about MA that CMS recently solicited from stakeholders detail these complaints (from physician and hospital associations, practitioners, acute care personnel, patients, brokers and others) again and again and again. A major strain in these complaints is from state employees forced into MA plans by retirement benefit packages.

This month, the Kaiser Family Foundation published a report, based on a literature review of 62 studies published since 2016, comparing "Beneficiary Experience, Affordability, Utilization, and Quality in Medicare Advantage and Traditional Medicare." The authors' conclusions are...inconclusive:

Will Republicans now learn to hate Medicare payment reform?

HHS and CMS yesterday announced a major expansion of efforts to move Medicare payments away from fee-for-service and toward so-called value-based and bundles payments. The ACA seeded this effort with a host of pilot programs, and the administration is looking to build on the momentum generated, as HHS Secretary Sylvia Burwell writes in the New England Journal of Medicine:

As we work to build a health care system that delivers better care, that is smarter about how dollars are spent, and that makes people healthier, we are identifying metrics for managing and tracking our progress. A majority of Medicare fee-for-service payments already have a link to quality or value. Our goal is to have 85% of all Medicare fee-for-service payments tied to quality or value by 2016, and 90% by 2018. Perhaps even more important, our target is to have 30% of Medicare payments tied to quality or value through alternative payment models by the end of 2016, and 50% of payments by the end of 2018. Alternative payment models include accountable care organizations (ACOs) and bundled-payment arrangements under which health care providers are accountable for the quality and cost of the care they deliver to patients. This is the first time in the history of the program that explicit goals for alternative payment models and value-based payments have been set for Medicare.

One worry about this initiative: phasing out fee-for-service has until now been a bipartisan goal. A bipartisan "doc fix" bill to update and reform the Medicare payment structure foundered only the question of how to pay for it - necessary because the status quo baked an unsustainable "Sustainable Growth Rate," established in 1997 and "patched" with a payment hike every year, into long-term budget projections.  The doc fix would have transitioned doctors to payments based on "performance scores" and, like the HHS/CMS initiative, encouraged formation of ACOs, medical homes and other structures purporting to foster coordinated care.

What the ACA can't cure

I recently referred to Investor's Business Daily reporter Jed Graham's coverage of the ACA as "adversarial." He objected. I responded, "I don't ignore or minimize ACA flaws but would not object to a characterization of my writing on it as "sympathetic."

That set me thinking about everything that troubles me about the ACA -- or, more accurately, things that trouble me about the US healthcare system that the ACA is unlikely to fix -- though it may help catalyze reform on several of these fronts. Here's the list:

1. All private health insurance in the U.S. is inadequate -- thanks to the shameful out-of-network billing, balance billing, and creative billing by hospitals, physicians and other providers documented in sickening detail by Elisabeth Rosenthal in her Paying Till it Hurts series. We are in the grip of a depraved system in which hospitals often operate as free billing zones and payers' attempts to control costs just generate new loopholes.

2. For the unsubsidized and lightly subsidized, private insurance on the ACA exchanges is too expensive. Or rather, medical care obtained under the insurance is too expensive.  One of the law's strengths is the Cost Sharing Reduction (CSR) that reduces deductibles and out-of-pocket costs for buyers with incomes below 200% of the Federal Poverty Level to levels comparable to those offered in top-grade employer-sponsored insurance (much more modest CSR is offered to those between 200% and 250% FPL).  Those cost control come into play if low income buyers choose silver plans (fortunately, most do) and if  they are not hit by the kind of out-of-network and balance billing that Rosenthal documents. Those above 200% FPL, however, have to choose between high monthly premiums and often sky-high deductibles, average over $5,000 for bronze plans (which may be tempting to many at the upper range of subsidy eligibility).

Is there a hole in the heart of U.S. healthcare cost control?

It's a given that the sine qua non of providing universal access to quality healthcare is effective cost control. That's especially true in the United States, where healthcare costs 50% more per capita than in the next most expensive country, Switzerland, and more than twice the OECD average, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. is the only wealthy country that does not insure all its citizens.

This high-cost starting point is the Affordable Care Act's pre-existing condition, the reality underlying bitter complaints about high premiums for the unsubsidized and narrow networks in exchange plans.  As Yogi Berra might say: if you want to make healthcare affordable to all, healthcare has to be affordable. To be successful, the ACA has to bend the cost curve -- or at least, maintain the windfall spending growth slowdown that seems to have taken hold over the last ten years -- at the same time it's expanding access.

The ACA's main efforts to control costs fall broadly into two categories. First, in Medicare payments, a series of pilot programs seek to move healthcare providers away from fee-for-service, via per-patient and per-episode payments and incentives to reduce costs and meet quality benchmarks. Second, in the exchanges, competition and price pressure induce insurers to reduce costs by a) putting a good deal of the cost burden on patients, via high deductibles and co-insurance payments, and b) offering narrow networks -- that is, limiting covered doctors and hospitals to those who meet the insurer's price (and, theoretically, quality) demands. In the broad category of putting price pressure on payers of all kinds also belongs the ACA's excise tax on the most expensive employer-sponsored plans, which is driving employers too toward both narrow networks and more cost-shifting to employees.

Cost control without cost controls?

Atul Gawande has expressed the hope that by seeding myriad experiments, the ACA will grow a few cost-saving sequoias  -- as an analogous outpouring of experiments and demonstration projects spurred by the U.S. Department of Agriculture revolutionized food production and drove down food prices in the early 20th Century.

I hope Gawande is right. He may be. But it might also be argued that all this experimentation is "designing around" the one cost control element that works in every other wealthy and is lacking in the U.S.: uniform pricing per procedure, imposed or at least overseen by government. (It's "overseen" in Switzerland, where hospital rates in each canton are negotiated by hospitals and insurers acting collectively, subject to approval by the cantonal government. Physicians are paid on a national fee-for-service scale.) Without that core shift in leverage away from healthcare providers, reforms are balkanized and incentives may fly in various directions.

Healthcare competition is good. Uniform pricing is better

Eduardo Porter today spotlights a key factor in healthcare inflation: consolidation among hospitals and other healthcare providers:

What is missing from the stampede of policy innovation is something to tackle one of the best-known causes of high costs in the book: excessive market concentration. 

Two decades ago, there were on average about four rival hospital systems of roughly equal size in each metropolitan area, according to research by Martin S. Gaynor of Carnegie Mellon University and Robert J. Town of the University of Pennsylvania. By 2006, the number of competitors was down to three. 

The share of metropolitan areas with highly concentrated hospital markets, by the standards of antitrust enforcers at the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission, rose to 77 percent from 63 percent over the period. 

What would Simpson-Bowles 2.0 do to Medicare?

Liberals are up in arms about the new Simpson-Bowles deficit reduction framework because, in brief, it calls for about $1.4 trillion less in revenue over ten years than Simpson-Bowles 1.0  (let's call it SB 1) along with roughly another $1.8 trillion in spending cuts, counting interest savings. That's more cuts than those mandated by the looming sequester, but more back-loaded, and with $600 billion coming from Medicare and Medicaid, which the sequester doesn't touch.

The shock comes from the reduction in proposed new revenue compared to the original plan, a change that simply reflects Obama's more limited revenue goals ($1.2 trillion over ten years at last ask, compared to $2.6 in SB 1). Spending cuts remain approximately the same, making the whole package proportionately more cut-heavy.

I want to look for a moment at the $600 billion in savings SB 2 proposes for "health care reforms" -- $200 billion more than SB 1 laid out, but  no more than Obama put forward in his last "grand bargain" offer to Boehner.  Simpson and Bowles envision bending the health care curve in ways that overlap with those envisioned by Obama -- though BS 1 cuts benefits in ways that Obama would not approve, and BS 2 would presumably cut benefits still more. Their rather sketchy new framework takes an "all of the above' approach to reducing healthcare costs -- hitting providers, beneficiaries, and drug companies:

Reduce Medicare and Medicaid spending by improving provider and beneficiary incentives throughout the health care system, reducing provider payments, reforming cost-sharing, increasing premiums for higher earners, adjusting benefits to account for population aging, reducing drug costs, and getting better value for our health care dollars (Feb-Dec 2013)

Morning in, ah, Medicare?

Well, it's a sunny pre-holiday Friday morning, and I am cheered by Ezekiel Emanuel in today's Times heralding the bending of the healthcare cost curve, as it now seems over the past ten years. On the cost control front, perhaps the ACA will look in retrospect something like the surge in Iraq, giving a jolt of indeterminate magnitude to a st of processes already in motion.

In any case, perhaps superficially, I am riffling through my mind the hopeful signs that have emerged on the healthcare front in recent weeks. If I want to go head over heels in caffeinated optimism, I might imagine that Atul Gawande's vision of a kind of venture capital process of reform stimulated by the ACA -- dozens of simultaneous experiments, a handful of which will yield dramatic results -- may actually occur over the next ten-odd years.

Hopeful signs include the fact that, for all the GOP's caterwauling about "bureaucrat-controlled" and "government-controlled" healthcare, beneath the radar some Republicans are looking at cost control measures that are indeed government-imposed, and likely to be effective.  For example, as I noted recently, two long-term "doc fix" bills are currently circulating in Congress, one bipartisan (but mainly Democrat), one Republican. While the GOP bill accords far more input to healthcare providers, both purport to either end or radically curtail fee-for-service payments.

A second sign of some nonideological thinking on the Republican side emanates from a bipartisan initiative, the Partnership for the Future of Medicare, co-chaired by former CBO head Douglas Holtz-Eakin and Ken Thorpe, a professor at Emory. The pair this week distilled a  PFM report in a post on the Health Affairs blog. I think of Holtz-Eakin, former economic adviser to the McCain campaign, as an intensely partisan critic of Obamanomics and the ACA, an impression gleaned mainly from quotes in news articles.  I was therefore somewhat surprised to learn that he is preaching the futility of simple cuts to benefit formulas, and calling for more systemic reform that does not simply rely on the Competition Fairy:

Will the 'doc fix' revolutionize U.S. healthcare?

I'm new to this, and so lack important context, but it looks to me as if a pending 'doc fix' -- a long-term replacement for the failed Medicare reimbursement formula (part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997) that Congress patches up every year --could transform our healthcare delivery system at least as sweepingly as the Affordable Care Act.

Modern Healthcare's Rich Daly reports that two rival bills have been introduced. A bipartisan bill all but phases out fee-for-service, while a GOP bill preserves but modifies it. The first,  introduced by Rep Allyson Schwartz (D-Pa) and co-sponsored by Rep. Joe Heck (R-Nev.), an osteopath, is summarized by Daly as follows:

Schwartz's bill (PDF) would mostly unravel the fee-for-service system by requiring physicians to adopt one of several replacement models that the CMS would test and approve over five years. Physicians who did not do so would face successive payment cuts, although a small number of physicians could remain in a modified fee-for-service system if they met certain quality benchmarks or were near retirement.

Obama the centrist

It's been a while since I checked in on Obama's weekly address. This week, the headliner is another call on Congress not to play chicken with the debt ceiling -- though based on recent polling, he's going to have to do better to explain to the public that raising the debt ceiling does not authorize new spending (not withstanding that poll's limitations).  A few other tidbits caught my eye, though:

1) While Obama paired job growth and deficit reduction, his emphasis again was on deficit reduction. That's partly a function of his focus on looming budget battles, but he still positions himself as a centrist who cuts spending while investing in the future (infrastructure, education, energy). He also invoked the confidence fairy.

2) When talking about cutting spending while preserving essential investments, Obama does not emphasize preserving Medicare and Social Security.  It's no secret to anyone not in the grip of right-wing paranoia that Obama is open to entitlement reform (though his preferred means of Medicare savings would work by squeezing providers and reducing unnecessary care by ending away from fee-for-service payments). He not only aims to transfer wealth from the wealthy to the poor and middle classes, but also, to some degree,  from the (nonpoor) elderly to children, parents of children, and broadly, "the future", via infrastructure and R&D.

Hey, Romneycare may get a 'death panel'

Not really. But legislation is afoot to create an IPAB (Independent Payment Advisory Board) on steroids -- Trenbolone to the ACA's Creatine. The WSJ's Jennifer Levitz and Anna Matthews report:

Key state legislative leaders unveiled a bill Friday that proposes setting a target for the rate at which overall health spending should rise—a step that would once again put the state in the forefront of efforts to remake the American health-care system...

Romney's blueprint for Obamacare, July 2009

Thanks to Andrew Kaczynski for unearthing a Mitt Romney op-ed, dated July 30, 2009, exhorting Obama to follow Romney's Massachusetts blueprint in crafting a national healthcare reform bill.

Kaczynski tweets that in this op-ed Romney urged Obama to adopt the individual mandate (unlike in a 2006 WSJ op-ed, where Romney took federalist cover, urging states to follow his lead) . More or less -- though in characteristic fashion Romney left himself a tortured loophole:

Using tax penalties, as we did, or tax credits, as others have proposed, encourages “free riders” to take responsibility for themselves rather than pass their medical costs on to others.

I can just hear him now: "I did not say that the federal government should impose a mandate." Barely true. Nevertheless, the piece is rife with ironies. Hectoring an implicitly clueless and venal student-executive, Romney urges Obama to

take his time:

Shortly after becoming governor, I worked in a bipartisan fashion with Democrats to insure all our citizens. It took almost two years to find a solution. 

drop the public option:

Massachusetts also proved that you don’t need government insurance. Our citizens purchase private, free-market medical insurance. There is no “public option.” With more than 1,300 health insurance companies, a federal government insurance company isn’t necessary...To find common ground with skeptical Republicans and conservative Democrats, the president will have to jettison left-wing ideology for practicality and dump the public option.

Obama's healthcare priorities

Ezra Klein brings into sharp focus an aspect of Obama's approach to healthcare reform that he has repeatedly noted in its component parts:

This is one thing that the Obama administration doesn't get enough praise or criticism for. The only ideas they've introduced into the debate, and the only ideas they've really stood and fought for against serious opposition, are cost-control ideas. Namely, the excise tax, the Medicare Commission, the insistence on deficit neutrality and the $900 billion price tag, none of which have a natural majority on the Hill, and all of which the Obama administration has kept in the game through direct advocacy.

I see this focus as an instance of Obama's propensity for "the long game."  The Administration probably calculates that Congress will inevitably expand coverage and subsidies as the inadequacies of the initial allotments become obvious -- whereas the architecture for beginning to bend the cost curve has to be in place from the start or the whole package will swiftly become unaffordable. Atul Gawande's vision -- of a potpourri of cost control measures, pilots and demonstration projects out of which at least a few will have a dramatic impact -- is also Obama's.  Here is how Obama described the process to Fred Hiatt, focusing on one potential meta-enabler of such methods, the MedPAC commission:

At this point, I am confident that both the House and the Senate bills will contain what we've been calling MedPAC on steroids, the idea that you continually present new ideas to change incentives, change the delivery system, understanding that because this is such a complex system we're not always going to get it exactly right the first time, and that there have to be a series of modifications over the course of a series of years, and we have to take that out of politics and make sure that an independent board of medical experts and health economists are providing packages that are continually improving the system. So I think there's general consensus that that is one of two very powerful levers to bend the cost curve.

I can see two strong objections either to Obama's strategy or my understanding of it.

Of venal dentists and patients' incentives

Don't get my father, 81, started on the incompetence and venality of (some) dentists. Troubled with bad teeth -- most of which he's managed to keep -- all his life, he's had several bouts of long, painful, expensive bridge work, periodontry, implants, etc. He's learned always to get two or three opinions. He loves to tell of the guy who told him he needed $4,000 worth of bridge work -- which another dentist told him was totally unnecessary, proving it with effective, much more limited treatment.

It occurs to me that dentists are likely no more venal than doctors (or members of any other profession). The difference is that since most of us don't have dental insurance, we know how much dental treatments will cost, if we care to ask. While I disagree with health care free marketeer David Goldhill's solutions to our health care crisis (ultra-high deductible insurance for all; HSAs for all; substantial services paid out of pocket), he has a point that we're apt to spend like drunken soldiers on health care when doctors tell us to, because we don't know the cost and don't bear much of it -- if we have decent coverage.

It stands to reason that many specialists, e.g., surgeons, whether out of unabashed "entrepreneurialism" or a natural tendency to believe that most people suffering from the ailments they treat will benefit from the very expensive treatments they offer, are as apt to recommend unnecessary expensive treatment as the dentist villain of my father's tale. When the procedure is high risk, many patients are likely to seek at least a second opinion. When it's not -- when the procedures are diagnostic, or hold out what seems a reasonable chance of quick relief from pain, or seem likely to eliminate what may be a very low-odds but deadly risk -- most people will go for it.

It is quite difficult to figure out the appropriate mechanisms and agency and incentives for cost-benefit analysis. Much of our problem is cultural. In a paper (fee required) on the causes of Americans' "overutilization" of medical services, Ezekiel Emanuel and Victor Fuchs identified 7 factors -- "4 related to physicians and 3 related to patients." Doctors' factors, according to Emanuel and Fuchs, are 1) training that places a premium on "enumerating all possible diagnoses and tests that would confirm or exclude them"; 2) fee-for-service, which creates incentives for overtreatment; 3) pharmaceutical marketing to doctors; and 4) medical malpractice laws. On the patient side, there is 1) the American cultural tendency "to embrace technologic fixes for problems"; 2) direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical marketing ; and 3) third-party payment for services, as outlined in this post.

Changing doctors' incentives has been the focal point of most discussion of health care cost containment. But changing the maximalist culture that patients have imbibed -- which starts by at least making costs transparent -- must also be part of the mix. No politician is going to tell the American people that. "It's your fault too" has never been a winning political message -- except to a minority, when a majority is calculated to overhear.

UPDATE: Ezra Klein, referring to the employer tax break for health care that produced our current system and so hides their cost of health care from most of us, points a way to change patient incentives:

I would like to see the tax preferences eliminated, and I would like to see every worker get the money their employer pays for their health care put back into their wages. Then I would like them to purchase health insurance on their own, so they see the full cost of it, and can decide whether they're willing to support more radical efforts to bring those costs down, or whether they're willing to accept more care management in order to save some money. This is, basically, how the Wyden-Bennett bill works, and it's why it's such a gamechanger. It's also why it has so little legislative support: It tries to solve the full problem when people only feel a small fraction of the problem.

In agreement with Klein and contra Goldhill, I would add that it makes more sense to induce people to give up a degree of autonomy over treatment courses in advance than to force each of us to factor in cost when we're up against major treatment decisions, such as whether to undergo bypass surgery.

Goldhill's health care fix: cure worse than disease?

David Goldhill's massive case for a radically "consumer-driven" health care system -- which I've always considered the worst, most Darwinian form of health care delivery -- deserves respect. I still believe that the incentives in a system where we each paid out of pocket for all medical expenses under, say, $50,000 would be even more skewed than those of the current system. But Goldhill's willingness to rethink the entire system of health care delivery raises several crucial and sobering points and claims worth thinking about, e.g.:

• While current U.S. health care spending may be more wasteful than that of any other developed country, health care inflation in countries with better systems, such as Canada and France, is almost as bad as in the U.S. No current system is controlling costs effectively. (Though Goldhill may overstate the equivalence. From 2000-2005, he claims, U.S. per capita health care spending grew 40% vs. 33% in Canada. That's not an insignificant difference.)
  
• The skewed incentives in the U.S. (and presumably other industrialized) systems go beyond those caused by fee-for-service; incentives are distorted primarily by the fact that we the consumers are not the "customers," i.e., the payers to whom the service providers are accountable.
• Health care is the only industry in which technological improvements lead to higher rather than lower costs.
• Health care is the only industry in which pricing is almost completely opaque (see Andrew Sullivan's view from your sick bed series, in which several participants have detailed the impossibility of getting pricing information in advance of service).
  
• In those few health care markets in which insurance does not kick in -- such as laser eye surgery -- competitive pricing and outcomes information have become a norm.
• Almost all of us are paying more in our working lifetime, via Medicare taxes, lost wage increases and co-pays, than we would likely spend on health care out of pocket, with catastrophic insurance.

Goldhill envisions a system in which we would each pay modestly for megacatastrophic insurance (covering expenses over, say, $50,000), make mandatory contributions to an HSA for major health care expenses, and pay smaller expenses out of pocket. The government could pay for the poor's catastrophic premiums and HSA contributions at relatively modest cost - less than that of Medicaid. Charity care would "go away." Doctors, hospitals, and specialty care facilities unleashed to compete with hospitals would be accountable to each of us for outcomes and cost.

What's wrong with this picture? I've always assumed that, faced with major surgery, it would be brutal to be forced to choose among competing surgeons based on cost and outcomes data. That's not necessarily so, if transparent data were to become the norm. Nonetheless, I think we'd all be faced with untenable cost-benefit calculations. A quadruple bypass or an operation for early stage prostate cancer may or may not be the best course of action for different patients. Should the prospect of spending $10k or $40k out of pocket tip the balance? Should such decisions be easier for the wealthy than for the middle class? (The poor would presumably be subsidized more heavily.) Not in what I would consider a civilized society.

As a counter-example to Goldhill's portrait of the laser surgery market, consider dental care, for which very few have insurance. The market is opaque and expensive, with no good outcomes data. There's nary a dentist who will not recommend more x-rays than you need. And in America today, poor teeth are a class marker; the poor generally simply don't get dental care.

Goldhill argues that bureaucratic cost controls can't control prices with the efficiency that a competitive market does. That may be true generally, but the proper comparison for health care is not with other consumer markets. The health care market is in some key ways naturally opaque. We'd be better off knowing what different surgeons charged for a prostate cancer operation. But we often can't know what we'll gain by getting the operation-- or what we'd lose (i.e., potentially, our life) if we abstained. Cost should figure into that equation -- if under certain circumstances "watchful waiting" or chemotherapy is as likely to have a good outcome as an operation. No provider should have an incentive for doing the more expensive thing. But cost shouldn't determine the individual's choice.

Annals of unpublished letters: NYT flags global payment proposal in Massachusetts

Today the Times editorial board, lauding the "Massachusetts experiment in near universal care," flags the recent proposal to move the state to a "global payment system":

Now the state seems poised to tackle costs — with an approach that is far more ambitious than anything currently being contemplated on Capitol Hill.

A special commission has just recommended that the state try, within five years, to move its entire health care system away from reliance on fee-for-service medicine, in which doctors are paid more for each additional test or procedure they provide.

In its place, the commission wants a system in which groups of doctors and hospitals would receive fixed sums to deliver whatever care a patient needed over the course of a year. The hope is that doctors would be motivated to deliver only the most appropriate care, not needless and excessively costly care, with safeguards to ensure that they do not skimp on quality.

On July 20, a certain frustrated letter writer sent this to the editorial board as well as to the letters editor:

While exhorting Congress to do more in pending healthcare reform legislation to control costs, the Times editorial board might have noted the truly radical core proposal of Massachusetts' Special Commission on the Healthcare Payment System: abandoning fee-for-service in favor a "global payment" system that pays by the patient, rather than by the treatment, and rewards good performance. At the core of this system would be development of Accountable Care Organizations that accept responsibility for the full spectrum of each patient's care.

This proposal goes to the heart of what the editorial board itself has identified as the central driver of healthcare inflation: providers' incentives to prescribe expensive -- and often unnecessary or unproven -- treatments. The reform, if adopted, will not be easy. The Commission envisions a five-year phase in period to develop a global payment system that "will include adjustments for clinical risk, socio-economic status, geography (if appropriate), core access and quality incentive measures, and other factors." But such reform, if adopted, would be truly fundamental.

Footnote: on a quick read, it appears that Medicare Advantage providers are paid by the patient rather than by the procedure -- and have not reduced healthcare costs. Why not? More on this later....

The Times points another arrow at fee-for-service medicine

Fee-for-service, fee-for-service, fee-for-service. Gradually the healthcare debate is centering on this major driver of runaway healthcare inflation. Atul Gawande and David Leonhardt have helped shine the spotlight on doctors' incentives to provide unnecessary care; Peter Orzag and Barack Obama (see "p.s." at link) have seized on their examples and language.

Today, the New York Times is front-paging a new poster child for putting doctors on salary. Gardener Harris profiles Bassett Healthcare, "a modest hospital of 180 beds" in Cooperstown, NY, to demonstrate that you don't have to be the Mayo Clinic to improve outcomes by realigning incentives, a.k.a. putting doctors on salary:

Bassett — like the Cleveland Clinic and a small number of other health systems in this country — pays salaries to all of its doctors. No matter how many tests or procedures are performed, they take home the same amount of money. Medical costs at Bassett are lower than those at 90 percent of the hospitals in New York, while the quality of care ranks among the top 10 percent in the nation, surveys show.

As at the Mayo Clinic and other treatment centers that have eschewed fee-for-service, the payment structure goes hand-in-hand with coordinated, integrated patient care:

Michelle Griffiths, 41, of Edmeston found a lump on her breast six years ago. During cancer care at Bassett, Ms. Griffiths’s appointments to see her oncologist and primary care doctor are often scheduled on the same day. One doctor will sometimes accompany her during a procedure performed by another, and each has her complete medical history.

“The communication amongst all of my doctors is impressive,” said Ms. Griffiths, who works as a database administrator for the insurance company New York Central Mutual. “They always call each other or shoot each other e-mails.”

Such coordinated care is a hallmark of integrated health systems with salaried doctors, like Kaiser Permanente, the Mayo Clinic, the Veterans Administration and the Cleveland Clinic.

Harris also highlights the political conundrum: everyone seriously engaged in healthcare reform knows that fee-for-service is a major inflation culprit. But as in the Aesop's fable in which a group of mice agree that they should hang a bell around the cat that's been gobbling them up, no one knows how to "bell the cat":

“Everyone knows that the Bassett model is the right model,” said Senator Charles E. Schumer, a New York Democrat involved in negotiations over health care legislation. “The question is, How do you get from here to there?"

In response, I wonder why the unanamious recommendations of the Massachusetts Special Commission on the Health Care Payment System are not getting more attetention. The Commission's central proposal takes direct aim at fee-for-service, proposing a five-year transition to "global payment systems" that pay doctors and hospitals per patient, with performance incentives, and adjustments for region, income, clinical risk and other factors. The recommendations appear to have broad, if cautious and equivocal support. The Times' Kevin Sack reports:

Top state legislators said that they recognized the political challenge in enacting such a plan but that Massachusetts’ circumstances demanded it. Senator Richard T. Moore, co-chairman of a joint legislative committee on health care financing, said he expected to hold hearings on the recommendations this fall. The committee’s other leader, Representative Harriett L. Stanley, said, “It’s going to be a very long haul, but it’s a trip worth taking.” [snip]

Interest groups with heavy stakes embraced the proposal, but warily.

“Hospitals want to be part of this historic endeavor,” said Lynn B. Nicholas, president of the Massachusetts Hospital Association. But Ms. Nicholas added that “the success of moving to a global payment system is not a foregone conclusion” and expressed concerns about how risks would be adjusted and how start-up costs would be covered.

The president of the state medical society, Dr. Mario E. Motta, also urged caution. “A big transition like this has never been done on such a broad scale,” Dr. Motta said, “so it must be done very carefully, deliberately and
thoughtfully.”

In Massachusetts, turning the battleship toward global payment systems appears to be recognized as a necessity if the 2006 reform plan that's already achieved near-universal coverage is not to bankrupt the state, as it's beginning to do. (Of course, the state has only taken a baby step toward reforming the payment system.) Will federal legislation have to follow the same road - extend coverage first, deal with the resulting financial emergency as it takes hold?