Showing posts with label bankruptcy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bankruptcy. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 12, 2009

Who owns credit default swaps on GM? And who's on the hook?

Mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives were supposed to spread risk but ended up impeding mortgage restructurings as ownership of each mortgage split into anonymous fragments.

Credit default swaps were designed to offset lenders' risk but now may impede restructurings outside of bankruptcy, as some CDS holders have more to gain from the CDS payout triggered by default than they have to lose from default on bonds they hold . The FT's Henny Sender explains that holders of credit default swaps on General Motors' debt may derail the restructuring plan now on the table:

...analysts say the chances the proposal will be accepted have been diminished by the large number of credit default swap (CDS) contracts written on GM’s debt.

Holders of such swaps would be paid in the event of a default – but would lose money if they agreed to restructure GM’s debt. For investors who own bonds and CDS, this could create an incentive to favour a bankruptcy filing....

“Chrysler looks like a simple two-car funeral compared to the traffic jam of assets and liabilities and contracts at GM,” said the credit research boutique CreditSights.

Question: aren't something like 80% of credit default swaps held by "naked" buyers that hold no debt - that is, by those who are speculating rather than insuring? Sender reports that investors hold $34bn in CDS on GM's debt and would receive net payments of $2.4bn if GM defaults. How much of that is owned by bondholders, 10% of whom can derail the restructuring?

Question 2: who underwrote the bulk of that $34 billion in CDS? When GM teetered on the brink of bankruptcy last December, some warned that bankruptcy could trigger a financial chain reaction - specifically, via CDS. Could this be another chapter in the AIG crisis?

Postscript: Companies have already been pushed into bankruptcy by CDS holders. The Deal had this on 4/27:
Money Morning newsletter author Martin Hutchinson argued that swaps were catalysts for the bankruptcies of AbitibiBowater Inc. and General Growth Properties Inc.

AbitibiBowater could not persuade enough of its bondholders to exchange a portion of its $6.2 billion in debt and went into bankruptcy. General Growth, with $27.3 billion of debt, also filed for bankruptcy after bondholders refused to approve a restructuring. Subsequently, the value of a major tranche of General Growth bonds was determined by auction to be worth 71% of par, allowing investors to receive $710,000 for each $1 million in CDSs. "A nice reward for voting 'no' to a restructuring," Hutchinson wrote

Sunday, January 18, 2009

Deflation nation?

Most Americans lucky enough to own any assets have lost - and are still in process of losing - a significant portion of their wealth in the current crisis. Home values will probably have dropped at least 30-40% before bottoming out. People with half their savings in stock funds have lost in the neighborhood of 20% since the fall 2007 peak-- often more, since most bond funds lost too, and most managed funds have outpaced the broad indexes in the downward dive. Those lucky enough not to have lost jobs or gotten seriously ill probably have lost/will lose about quarter of their nominal net worth.

At the same time, wealth is a fluid and relative thing. What we've lost -- if it doesn't reach the level of something that massively impacts current life, like a home or health -- won't be clear for a long time, and may even turn to gain, if we build on more sustainable foundations. That is, if our collective wealth is more equitably and efficiently shared, if we succeed in reforming education and rebuilding effective public safety nets and fostering innovation in sustainable industries. . Life is long, as Salman Rushdie characters bent on revenge like to say -- and so are our economic biographies.

One large set of variables in assessing economic losses is the potential upside of deflation, broadly understood. Deflation, as officially defined by economists, is both a very bad thing -- perhaps the main precondition of a true Depression -- and relatively modest in percentage terms. Like headline inflation over the last two decades, any official deflation we undergo is likely to register in low single digits.

But headline inflation has not captured a far more rapid inflation in the "Three H's" of economic well-being -- homes, higher education, and healthcare. Add to those high costs the increase of major risk in middle class American life -- job loss, loss of health insurance (or loss of adequate health insurance), loss of defined benefit pensions -- and we've clearly suffered a major "inflation" in the sense that solvency and security are more difficult to obtain than they were a generation ago. The convergence and bursting of our several debt bubbles has made it clear that much of our national wealth was illusory.

If real inflation has outstripped officially measured inflation, perhaps a more broadly understood deflation, enabled in part by good policy, will not only far outstrip any official cost-of-living deflation (or co-exist with official inflation), but actually make prosperity and security more attainable. The linchpins of economic well-being should become relatively easier to obtain:
  • Housing: In my New Jersey suburb, 20 miles from New York City, small starter homes scraped $600,000 in 2005. How could even affluent young couples afford, say, a $550,000 mortgage? Probably by taking on some exotic interest-only loan, with the rate escalating in 2-3 years - taken on the assumption that the couple could then either refinance or trade up, financing a more expensive home with profits from the first one. In a year or two or five, that same starter home may cost $400,000 or less, with a mortgage -- if the couple can obtain one -- at a fixed rate under 5%.
  • Higher education: I've never really understood the massive runup in college costs, topping out today at over $50,000 per year at prestigious private colleges. Today it's hard to imagine schools, themselves slammed by the fiscal crisis, lowering costs. What should improve fast, though, is the disgustingly exploitive privatization of the student loan business, whereby schools have steered students into loans with opaque terms and usurious rates, sometimes scraping 20% for students in trade schools training for relatively low-wage professions. Expanded opportunities to trade tuition aid for service commitments should also help to bring college within reach for many. At the same time, a swift, massive cultural shift away from all kinds of spending, stemming from economic hardship, should at least slow tuition inflation.
  • Healthcare: Effective health insurance reform that provides affordable coverage for the uninsured and mandates adequate coverage of catastrophic costs will halt an enormous source of wealth destruction for Americans. If we can't get this done, and at least bring our healthcare costs and outcomes to the levels enjoyed by most advanced democracies, there's simply no hope for continued American prosperity. Can we afford it in the midst of the economic meltdown? As Obama asked in a Dec. 11 press conference: How can we afford not to?
  • Debt and consumption: Harsher bankruptcy laws were supposed to discipline borrowers. Now, a massive wave of bankruptcies is disciplining lenders. In hard times, people will take on less discretionary debt and save more. That's bad for the economy short-term, but it will mean less money spent on debt service for many Americans. Debt servicing aside, spending less money on what you don't need makes you wealthier. And while vast numbers of Americans have been driven deep into debt and bankruptcy by circumstances beyond their control, such as uninsured or underinsured illness, there's no doubt that we've all been culturally inclined to spend more than we need to on nonessentials.
I've always daydreamed occasionally about being offered fairy tale choices, such as Achilles' choice between a long and happy or short and glorious life. One such imagined supernatural game show question that I posed to myself at various points in the election cycle: would you give up, say, a quarter of your worldly wealth to see Obama elected? That is, to have a shot at this country rolling back the shredding of our civil liberties, belligerent adventurism abroad, growing economic inequality at home, accelerated global warming, etc. etc.? Framed as a purely economic choice: would you stand for a drastic downward revaluation of your assets this year, as part of a national and indeed worldwide revaluing and rebalancing, forcing national and international efforts to restructure on a more sustainable footing? To get even deeper into the realm of nonsensical cosmic planning, this time from a future vantage: was it worth eight years of Bush to get us to Obama?

What's the point of framing up supernatural pseudo-choices? Only to get somehow at this: democracy's saving grace is the capacity to self-correct. In the past, the country has recovered from horrendous mistakes to move on toward renewed prosperity, and, as Obama likes to say, progress toward a more perfect union. The election suggests that American democracy has retained that capacity for self-correction. Will we be able to dig ourselves out the hole we've dug. Obama says "yes we can." For this long lovely moment, the country seems disposed to agree.

Monday, November 24, 2008

Three circles of economic hell after a Big Three bankruptcy

As auto industry Armegeddon approaches, many are crying "let 'em eat coke." Let the Big Three go through bankruptcy hell and rise from the ashes, cleansed of their legacy labor costs, like the steel industry. Or keep on truckin' through bankruptcy, like the airlines.

Today, three separate sources brought home to me, in very different ways, the likely cataclysmic effects of auto industry failure.

1. On the Times op-ed page, former energy secretary Spencer Abraham argues that the airline and steel industry analogies are flawed. Bankrutpcy for an automaker will mean liquidation because
To purchase a car is to make a multiyear commitment: the buyer must have confidence that the manufacturer will survive to provide parts and service under warranty. With a declaration of bankruptcy, that confidence evaporates. Eighty percent of consumers would not even consider buying a car or truck from a bankrupt manufacturer, one recent survey indicates. So once a bankruptcy proceeding got started, the company’s revenue would plummet, leading it to hemorrhage cash to cover its high fixed costs.
No revenue means no DIP financing and no rebirth. Abraham ticks off the knock-on effects: a "cascade" of bankruptcies among parts makers, a squeeze on surviving automakers as suppliers fear to extend credit, liquidation of the Big 3, three million jobs gone in the first year, new burdens on government healthcare and pension guarantee services, enormous credit strains on banks holding auto loans.

2. Also into today's Times, Zachery Kouwe and Louise Story lay out the multiple levels of the financial sector's exposure to auto industry debt: $100 billion that the automakers owe directly to banks and bondholders; another $47 billion in loans to Big 3 affiliates backed by auto leases and loans; billions loaned to Cerberus in its leveraged buyout of Chrysler; untold billions more to parts suppliers, dealerships, and of course increasingly distressed consumers.

3. Finally, in today's FT, Wolfgang Munchau reminds us that in the wake of a big 3 bankruptcy credit default swaps would once again prove themselves, in Warren Buffet's phrase, financial weapons of mass destruction:
Naturally, [a carmaker bankruptcy] would be bad for the US car industry itself. But it might be even worse for the banks, especially those that got involved with credit default swaps – probably the most dangerous financial products ever invented. CDSs are unregulated shadow insurance products that investors buy to protect themselves against default of corporate and sovereign bonds. Protection against a default by General Motors was among the most sought-after contracts.
Some have called for a "managed bankruptcy." Looks to me like a managed bailout, with all stakeholders giving up something in advance, would be a lot less risky.