If Republicans win it all, what will they do to the ACA?

I want to make a foray into reporting and ask some healthcare wonks what they think Republicans will do to the Affordable Care Act if they win both houses of Congress and the presidency by 2016.

While Republicans gleefully anticipate the ACA's implosion, ACA supporters assure themselves that repeal is a dead dream, as the ACA has already provided insurance to millions and rewritten coverage rules (e.g., guaranteed issue) in ways that will be impossible to take away. That may be true. But it does seem to me that Republicans in control of Congress and the presidency could ruin the law without repealing it outright.  They could do so out of a combination of antipathy to a law that (colloquially) bears Obama's name and sincere belief in principles such as consumer choice and deregulation.

The WSJ spotlights an apparent anomaly in ACA subsidies

Once again, the WSJ combines factual accuracy with a negative emphasis in its reporting about the Affordable Care Act.

Today's front-pager, by Christopher Weaver and Louise Radnofsky, spotlights an anomaly: When the subsidies offered by the federal government are taken into account, older adults will pay less for insurance on the ACA exchanges than young adults of the same income if they opt for the cheapest, bronze-level plans. That raises the specter of adverse selection and is therefore worrying insurers, who have to offer insurance to older adults relatively cheaply (but not as cheaply as Weaver and Radnofsky imply). Here's the lede:

For state GOP officials, a manual for undermining Obamacare

In 2011, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) produced a report cataloging risks of adverse selection in the ACA state insurance exchanges and provisions in the ACA designed to avoid or mitigate those risks. (Adverse selection occurs in plans that chiefly attract less health and more expensive customers, e.g. when younger, healthier customers have other options more attractive to them, including remaining uninsured.)

One key ACA measure to mitigate adverse selection is as follows. Those who offer insurance on the exchanges must treat all their customers in that state as one risk pool and must offer silver and gold plans -- the middle options in a spectrum that runs from bronze to platinum. If "young invincibles" choose bronze plans, their choices won't affect pricing in more expensive plans, which may be more attractive to older and sicker customers.

A continued risk is posed, however, by the ongoing existence of an individual market outside the exchanges, where insurers may still sell cheap high-deductible plans that appeal to healthy young people, albeit subject to many if not all of the same rules governing plans offered in the exchanges. In yesterday's New York Times, Eduardo Porter outlined that risk: