To what extent did SCOTUS inhibit Congress's power to regulate commerce?

Yesterday, I suggested that the Supreme Court's finding that the individual mandate exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause powers did not in fact crimp Congress's ability to regulate commerce in any significant way, since Congress has no desire to impose any more purchase mandates. Donald Verrilli stressed in his reply brief that health insurance is a unique case, pointing out that states, which have an unquestioned power to impose purchase mandates, don't do it. Justice Ginsburg made the same point in exquisite detail in her dissent with regard to the Commerce Clause.

In today's Times, however, Neal Katyal, who served as acting Solicitor General after Obama appointed Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court and who argued the ACA case at the appellate level, makes a compelling case that the decision did limit the federal government's power and expand the Court's propensity to legislate from the bench in significant ways. Chief among them was in its invalidation of Congress's power to enforce its expanded Medicaid mandate: