On Neustadt's gold standard for presidential power

I am nearing the end of the chapters comprising the original edition of Richard Neustadt's Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents (originally focused on the presidencies of Truman and Eisenhower, later much expanded).  The original edition is in large part a close study of two failures in presidential decision-making: Truman letting his policy in Korea be shaped by MacArthur's military overreach, and Eisenhower failing to resolve internal splits in his administration over budget policy, and therefore appearing several times over the course of a year to contradict his own prior policies and pronouncements.

The basic premise is that almost nothing happens simply because the president decrees that it should: presidential power depends on convincing a multitude of individuals and constituencies that the president has the ability to help or harm them.  There is a chicken-egg aspect to this: the president convinces people of his power when things that he says will or should happen do in fact happen, and when the results are in line with his stated goals or expectations.  That means being highly alert to the human, interpersonal factors that can undermine both policy decision-making and execution - for example, a rift between budget director and Treasury secretary, or military brass unwilling to cross a legendary general in the field. The requisite alertness can only come from a president developing his own back-channel information network: he (or someday she, as Neustadt enthusiastically adds in a latter-day preface) must constantly be gathering such intelligence from a multitude of sources.

This all seems solid information as far as it goes, derived from Neustadt's personal experience in government as well as by talking to a lot of people in government. And yet, toward the end of the original edition, the thesis is nailed down by means that make a bit wary on structural grounds.

Obama changes the subject

...that is, the grammatical subject of his sentences when he's calling out certain parties for obstructing his jobs agenda.

Jonathan Cohn has already made this point in brief. But I'm going to gild the lily, overemphasize it, put the obvious in boldface below, because this rhetorical turn goes to the heart of how Obama has driven his supporters mad in recent months via continued pursuit of compromise and bipartisan cooperation with those who keep drive-by shooting him.

On Labor Day, Obama moved away from his months-long practice of criticizing "Congress" for blocking formerly bipartisan, consensus measures to boost trade and growth and instead called out "congressional Republicans." Got that?  The subject (or object) of the sentence is not "Congress" (sidelined as an adjective) but "Republicans." Way to call a spade a spade, Mr. President. It's been a long time coming.

Compare the pablum in Obama's Sept. 3 weekly address:

The well-tempered Presidential anecdote

Okay, who planted this little anecdote in the Times narrative of Obama's decision-making process re McChrystal?

The press secretary, Robert Gibbs, walked a copy of it to the president in the private quarters. After scanning the first few paragraphs — a sarcastic, profanity-laced description of General McChrystal’s disgust at having to dine with a French minister to brief him about the war — Mr. Obama had read enough, a senior administration official said. He ordered his political and national security aides to convene immediately in the Oval Office.

Dissing the French, dissing the job, retorting like a teen to his aide, not a word about any Administration official....highlighting this perfectly emphasizes Obama's keynote: