Data in the chatter: life in the Nate Silver era

The Democrats' loss of the House in 1994, like most high-stakes contests, was treated like a morality play, and widely ascribed to the ignominious dissolution of the party's healthcare reform efforts.

This year, determined not to repeat the past, Democrats screwed their courage to the sticking post and passed a comprehensive HCR bill.

What if this brave and purposeful action is followed by, say, an 80-seat loss, as Sean Trende (that's a stage name, right?) provisionally forecasts and Jonathan Chait acknowledges as a not-unlikely scenario?

Personally, I'm fine with it. I think a Republican takeover of either chamber would be bad for the country.  But the 111th Congress has done what it set out to do, and what it had to do to save the country's short-term (via the stimulus) and long-term (via HCR) economic prospects. My hat is off, and my wallet is open.  If the party loses big-time in November, I will chalk it up to a) natural tidal movement following large gains in the past two elections, b) being caught holding the bag following the financial meltdown, and c) the power of relentless Republican demagoguery, feeding on the anger of a country enduring near-10% unemployment, and amplified in ever-new ways by Fox, Limbaugh etc.

Minorities set us free

Via Andrew Sullivan, Nate Silver's take on the ethnic underpinnnings of the Democratic resurgence:

Consider this remarkable statistic. In 1980, 32 percent of the electorate consisted of white Democrats (or at least white Carter voters) -- likewise, in 2008, 32 percent of the electorate consisted of white Obama voters. But whereas, in 1980, just 9 percent of the electorate were nonwhite Carter voters, 21 percent of the electorate were nonwhite Obama voters last year. Thus, Carter went down to a landslide defeat, whereas Obama defeated John McCain by a healthy margin.

I am struck by the economic implications of this shift in the electorate. The average Democratic voter is probably not poorer relative to the average Republican than in 1980, since Democrats have lost poor white voters and probably gained richer white ones. Nonetheless, the ethnic shift in the U.S. population does give the less well-off more of a voice-- at least if you assume that Democrats can represent the economic interests of the less well-off more effectively than Republicans.

At the height of the Bush era, as income inequality soared, lobbyists and Republicans flaunted their symbiosis, Rovian smear campaigning reached its apotheosis and the Republicans increased their majorities in Congress, it was possible to think that American democracy was being hollowed out by an oligarchy that was cementing its economic gains with a lock on the political process. But it turned out that the country's hardening democratic arteries still ran clear enough --defibrillated by an unpopular and mismanaged war started until false pretenses -- to give the Democrats a fresh shot at rolling back the great wealth shift and the great risk shift of the last 30 years.

As in 1980, democracy performed its core function: give failure its due reward, throw the bums out, and let a fresh crew at least try to do better. Today that means mending the safety net, rebuilding the educational system, and creating more opportunity for those not born into privelege.