Clive Crook hazards a false moral on healthcare

Scouting the Obama healthcare plan for leaving employer based health insurance intact, Clive Crook succumbs to a Republican "ownership society" shibboleth. He'd have us believe that the runup in healthcare costs is driven mainly by consumers:

The real problem is slowing the remorseless trend of future growth. Until healthcare consumers are made to think about costs, that may be impossible. Consumers resist constraint because they think employers are paying for their health insurance; in fact, of course, workers are paying through lower wages.

In fact, the runup in healthcare costs is mainly driven by the incentive structure for doctors, who are paid by the procedure and have financial incentives to order costly tests and treatments (and the negative incentive of defensive medicine, thanks to our litigiousness); by drug companies, which deploy multiple means of bribing doctors to prescribe expensive (and often unproven) new medications, and who have lobbied their way to nearly unchecked pricing power; by insurers, who waste half of doctors' time with insanely arcane claims procedures and cherry-pick the healthiest patients; by the legions of uninsured, whose uncompensated care adds nearly a thousand dollars to the average family healthcare premium; and by the massive failure of our swiss cheese system to deliver preventive care.

It is counterproductive and immoral to induce people to access less healthcare by creating strong financial incentives to eschew treatment. In fact that's just what we do: there are tens of millions of people in this country halving their medication doses, going years without dental care, and avoiding visits to specialists they can ill-afford. You can't have adequate preventive care when every visit demands a consequential financial outlay.

Far from overconsuming healthcare, even Americans with insurance are increasingly underinsured. As reported by Jacob S. Hacker in The Great Risk Shift (2006):

Among insured Americans, 51 million spend more than 10 percent of their income on medical care. One out of six working-age adults are carrying medical debt,and 70 percent had insurance when they incurred it...nearly six in ten of the underinsured postponed needed medical care because of the cost, nearly four in ten had to put off home or car maintenance or repairs due to medical expenses, a third had to dig deep into their savings to pay for medical care, and more than one in five made job-related decisions based mainly on their health care needs. Strikingly, the median family income of the underinsured was $58,000--almost exactly the same as the median income of those with adequate coverage.

Crook has fallen victim to the Republican fallacy that adequate, affordable care creates "moral hazard" -- that patients will gorge themselves on on an open medical buffet if every item is not a la carte. In our healthcare system, the players morally at hazard are doctors who earn more if they prescribe more services, insurers who earn more by cherry-picking customers, and drug companies that earn more by turning doctors into shills. In the U.S., patients' hazard is physical and financial, not moral.

Belief among healthcare economists and policymakers that freedom from paying substantial fee-for-service sums leads patients to inefficiently overuse healthcare services rests largely on the famous RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), a study of consumers provided with varying forms of health insurance over an extended period of time. The RAND HIE, begun in 1974 with results published in 1987 and 1993, purported to find that those in plans where they paid no fees for individual services used more healthcare than those in fee-for-service plans but did not enjoy any measurable health benefits as a result. In other words, the additional care accessed by those for whom services were "free" was effectively wasted.

This conclusion was effectively debunked in an analysis by John A. Nyman, published in October 2007 in the Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law. Noting that all participants in HIE had the option of dropping out at will and returning to the health plan they held prior to the experiment, Nyman reported that sixteen times as many participants dropped out of the fee-for-service plans as out of the free plans. Since participants were given a financial incentive to remain in the experiment, the inescapable conclusion is that those who dropped out of the fee-for-service plans did so because they became seriously ill or were injured badly enough to need expensive care. In Nyman's analysis, "moral hazard" is exposed as essentially another word for "risk sharing." Those who need expensive healthcare access it if it is not financially prohibitive; those who don't need expensive procedures subsidize those who do. That's what insurance is for.