In press conferences on Aug. 28, Sept. 3 and Sept. 5, and in a Meet the Press interview on Sept. 7, Obama provided considerable detail about the way he plans to "degrade and ultimately destroy" ISIS. Key themes, cumulatively elaborated over the four sessions, were that 1) The U.S. would not act precipitously in Syria; 2) Obama would not "Americanize" struggle -- U.S. military support would be calibrated to Sunni political action; and 3) the effort would build methodically and take considerable time.
Earlier today I traced these themes through all four of these quite recent Q&As because I assumed that they would serve as prelude to tonight's speech, which would distill them and continue to bring them into sharper focus. But the speech didn't do that. It was the comic book version -- the barest outline. It did not grapple with how the U.S. can build capacity to fight ISIS and foster the beginnings of viable government in Syria, an effort that Obama previously more or less rejected as futile -- and which he did address at least partially on 9/5 and 9/7, suggesting that the difference is greater motive and pressure on nearby Sunni nations to act in concert. He didn't provide any detail as to what degree of Congressional buy-in he considers necessary or unnecessary. He held up U.S. efforts against al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Somalia as models, rather than his fight against core al Qaeda, seemingly to minimize the threat, though ISIS arguably has more capacity now than bin Laden's group ever did.
Earlier today I traced these themes through all four of these quite recent Q&As because I assumed that they would serve as prelude to tonight's speech, which would distill them and continue to bring them into sharper focus. But the speech didn't do that. It was the comic book version -- the barest outline. It did not grapple with how the U.S. can build capacity to fight ISIS and foster the beginnings of viable government in Syria, an effort that Obama previously more or less rejected as futile -- and which he did address at least partially on 9/5 and 9/7, suggesting that the difference is greater motive and pressure on nearby Sunni nations to act in concert. He didn't provide any detail as to what degree of Congressional buy-in he considers necessary or unnecessary. He held up U.S. efforts against al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen and Somalia as models, rather than his fight against core al Qaeda, seemingly to minimize the threat, though ISIS arguably has more capacity now than bin Laden's group ever did.