In 2016, CBO started counting Medicaid enrollment differently

CORRECTION, 6/6/17: Somehow, I missed an email response to my query from CBO (and asked them again twice after receiving the email). In 2016, they did not count partial benefit enrollees in their Medicaid totals; rather, the difference was that they counted people with multiple sources of coverage, including Medicaid, as Medicaid enrolled, whereas in past years they counted only the coverage source deemed primary. I was correct that in 2016 they started counting dual eligibles in both Medicaid and Medicare.

In a US News article by Kimberly Leonard about why the ACA private plan marketplace is not meeting enrollment expectations, while the ACA as a whole is reducing the ranks of the uninsured more or less on schedule, this claim did not compute:

Under Obamacare, states were allowed to expand the program to many more people, but many states have opted not to. Despite that, 16 million people more than expected enrolled in Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Plan, including in states that did not expand the program. Many people, it turns out, realized that they could have qualified for Medicaid even before the passage of the health care law.

Similarly, last March, when the Congressional Budget Office published its latest forecast of the ACA's effects, The New York Times' Robert Pear reported:

What if all the ACA "options" were "public"?

Consider these two facts about current U.S. health insurance markets.

First, as Bruce Japsen reports in Forbes:

Though the nation’s health insurance industry is having a tough time turning a profit selling individual policies on the public exchanges under the Affordable Care Act, the health law’s Medicaid expansion is churning big profits.

It's fair, O Robert Pear, to spotlight high deductibles in ACA plans. But some context is missing.

An article by the New York Times' Robert Pear, spotlighting the plight of ACA marketplace customers who bought plans with sky-high deductibles, had my eyeballs shooting lasers in two directions.

On the one hand, kudos to Pear, not only for showing the absurdity of offering plans with deductibles north of $6,000 per person to people who are not affluent, but for spanking HHS for emphasizing low premiums uber alles:

Sylvia Mathews Burwell, the secretary of health and human services, issued a report analyzing premiums in the 38 states that use HealthCare.gov. “Eight out of 10 returning consumers will be able to buy a plan with premiums less than $100 a month after tax credits,” she said.

I have complained about that misdirection repeatedly, most recently noting that only about 5 in 10 will be able to buy a silver plan for under $100 and thus access the Cost Sharing Reduction (CSR) subsidies that are available only with silver. So Burwell is effectively hawking bronze plans to those who, as Pear illustrates, won't be able to use them.

On the other hand, Pear exaggerates the prevalence of super-high deductibles among marketplace enrollees. His acknowledgment of CSR is buried deep and lacks context:

The ACA's invisible deductible discounts

The healthcare Twittersphere was riveted yesterday by Robert Pear's spotlight on Harvard professors up in arms about comparatively modest deductibles and copays added to their excellent health plan.

The main underlying story, as Adrianna McIntyre pointed out, is that cost-shifting to employees is accelerating in employer-sponsored insurance, driven in part by the ACA's Cadillac tax on the most generous plans.

There's a second story, however, in Pear's use of the ACA exchanges as a foil to highlight Harvard employees' relative privilege. Pear contrasted the Harvard plan's 91% actuarial value with that of a silver ACA plan, which he said "typically" covers just 70% of the average user's medical costs. As I pointed out yesterday, only about 20% of silver plan buyers get plans with an AV of 70%. For the rest, income-based Cost Sharing Reduction (CSR) raises the AV -- to 94%, 87% or 73%, depending on the buyer's household income. Available stats indicate that over 60% of silver plan buyers are at the AV 87% or 94% levels.

The broader point here is that the apparent prevalence of high deductibles on the ACA exchanges is somewhat misleading. As has been widely reported, bronze plans single-person deductibles average over $5,000, and silver plans (unenhanced by CSR) close to $3,000. Moreover,if you take a spin on the shop-arounds offered by Healthcare.gov and most state exchanges, the first price quotes you'll see are for bronze plans with deductibles in the $5,000-6,600 range, since available plans are most often displayed sorted by premium, lowest first.

NYT spotlights plight of ACA bronze plan buyers, leaves out vital context

[first posted 10/18]

The Times has a front-page story today, by Abby Goodnough and Robert Pear, that highlights the plight of ACA private plan buyers who bought plans with such high deductibles that they are foregoing needed treatment.  This is a real problem -- bronze plans in particular have terribly high deductibles, averaging $5,000 per individual -- but vital context is missing. Here's the framing:

About 7.3 million Americans are enrolled in private coverage through the Affordable Care Act marketplaces, and more than 80 percent qualified for federal subsidies to help with the cost of their monthly premiums. But many are still on the hook for deductibles that can top $5,000 for individuals and $10,000 for families — the trade-off, insurers say, for keeping premiums for the marketplace plans relatively low. The result is that some people — no firm data exists on how many — say they hesitate to use their new insurance because of the high out-of-pocket costs.

The first thing to note is that low-income ACA shoppers were generally not subject to these high deductibles. Low-income marketplace shoppers should generally not be buying bronze plans  -- not only because the deductibles are higher than those of silver-level plans, but because the silver plans alone come with Cost Sharing Reduction (CSR) subsidies. These reduce deductibles and maximum out-of-pocket costs for buyers with household income below 250% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). CSR subsidies are really large for buyers under 200% FPL, giving silver plans actuarial values comparable to those of the most generous employer-sponsored plans for those in that income range. The Goodnough-Pear story does explain CSR, but deep in the story, following four hard-case individual narratives.

Bronze plans had relatively low takeup in the ACA's first open season. According to HHS statistics, just 20% of users in all marketplaces (state-run as well as healthcare.gov) bought bronze plans. Since 33% of buyers who earned too much to qualify for subsidies bought bronze, less than 20% of the subsidy-eligible must have done so.

How about a doctor's mandate in the health reform law?

The Times' Robert Pear today reports on a major roadblock to expanding health care access in the United States: in many states, few or no doctors in a wide array of specialties will see Medicaid patients.  And the Affordable Care Act aims to add about 15 million people to the Medicaid rolls, while cash-strapped states continue to cut Medicaid reimbursement rates.

I have a solution. It's simplistic, and perhaps someone will demonstrate to me that it's unworkable or unfair. It's surely politically impossible at this point, given the power of the doctors' lobby.  But here it is: require doctors to devote a minimum percentage of their practice to Medicaid patients.  At present, about 28% of doctors refuse to accept any Medicaid patients.  The percentages are doubtless much higher in some practice specialties and states.

On educating voters

The Times' Robert Pear reports that labor leaders are backing away from the pre-Scott Brown compromise forged between House and Senate Democrats over the excise tax in the health care reform bill, on grounds that "the proposal is too high a price to pay for the limited health care package they expect to emerge from Congress."

If that's true, it would seem that labor leaders don't expect the House to pass the Senate bill with a "reconciliation sidecar," which is very bad news.   Also striking, though, is the article's snapshot of the extent to which attacks on the bill from all sides have penetrated voters' perceptions, whereas its virtues have not. The attacks cross-fertilize: 

At meetings of the House Democratic Caucus, lawmakers from Massachusetts, including Representatives Edward J. Markey and Richard E. Neal, said they were struck by the vehemence of opposition to the tax in their districts.

Mr. Markey recalled that a constituent had poked him in the chest and said: “Eddie, I’ve voted for you my whole life. But if you think you will tax my benefits and give the money to Ben Nelson in Nebraska, you’re crazy.” Senator Nelson, Democrat of Nebraska, voted for the bill after it was rewritten to provide extra Medicaid money to his state.

To which there's an obvious response: if the excise bill is in there, the Nelson giveaway won't be. Even Nelson has asked that the special deal for Nebraska be removed from the bill. So any deal that House Democrats cut that allows a portion of the Senate bill's excise tax to remain in place would entail getting rid of the Nelson deal.

Markey does not say that he did not make that point to the voter. But so many Democrats seem so cowed by every line of attack, no matter how partial, trivial, misleading, disingenuous  -- it's agonizing to watch them cringe.