The Times points another arrow at fee-for-service medicine

Fee-for-service, fee-for-service, fee-for-service. Gradually the healthcare debate is centering on this major driver of runaway healthcare inflation. Atul Gawande and David Leonhardt have helped shine the spotlight on doctors' incentives to provide unnecessary care; Peter Orzag and Barack Obama (see "p.s." at link) have seized on their examples and language.

Today, the New York Times is front-paging a new poster child for putting doctors on salary. Gardener Harris profiles Bassett Healthcare, "a modest hospital of 180 beds" in Cooperstown, NY, to demonstrate that you don't have to be the Mayo Clinic to improve outcomes by realigning incentives, a.k.a. putting doctors on salary:

Bassett — like the Cleveland Clinic and a small number of other health systems in this country — pays salaries to all of its doctors. No matter how many tests or procedures are performed, they take home the same amount of money. Medical costs at Bassett are lower than those at 90 percent of the hospitals in New York, while the quality of care ranks among the top 10 percent in the nation, surveys show.

As at the Mayo Clinic and other treatment centers that have eschewed fee-for-service, the payment structure goes hand-in-hand with coordinated, integrated patient care:

Michelle Griffiths, 41, of Edmeston found a lump on her breast six years ago. During cancer care at Bassett, Ms. Griffiths’s appointments to see her oncologist and primary care doctor are often scheduled on the same day. One doctor will sometimes accompany her during a procedure performed by another, and each has her complete medical history.

“The communication amongst all of my doctors is impressive,” said Ms. Griffiths, who works as a database administrator for the insurance company New York Central Mutual. “They always call each other or shoot each other e-mails.”

Such coordinated care is a hallmark of integrated health systems with salaried doctors, like Kaiser Permanente, the Mayo Clinic, the Veterans Administration and the Cleveland Clinic.

Harris also highlights the political conundrum: everyone seriously engaged in healthcare reform knows that fee-for-service is a major inflation culprit. But as in the Aesop's fable in which a group of mice agree that they should hang a bell around the cat that's been gobbling them up, no one knows how to "bell the cat":

“Everyone knows that the Bassett model is the right model,” said Senator Charles E. Schumer, a New York Democrat involved in negotiations over health care legislation. “The question is, How do you get from here to there?"

In response, I wonder why the unanamious recommendations of the Massachusetts Special Commission on the Health Care Payment System are not getting more attetention. The Commission's central proposal takes direct aim at fee-for-service, proposing a five-year transition to "global payment systems" that pay doctors and hospitals per patient, with performance incentives, and adjustments for region, income, clinical risk and other factors. The recommendations appear to have broad, if cautious and equivocal support. The Times' Kevin Sack reports:

Top state legislators said that they recognized the political challenge in enacting such a plan but that Massachusetts’ circumstances demanded it. Senator Richard T. Moore, co-chairman of a joint legislative committee on health care financing, said he expected to hold hearings on the recommendations this fall. The committee’s other leader, Representative Harriett L. Stanley, said, “It’s going to be a very long haul, but it’s a trip worth taking.” [snip]

Interest groups with heavy stakes embraced the proposal, but warily.

“Hospitals want to be part of this historic endeavor,” said Lynn B. Nicholas, president of the Massachusetts Hospital Association. But Ms. Nicholas added that “the success of moving to a global payment system is not a foregone conclusion” and expressed concerns about how risks would be adjusted and how start-up costs would be covered.

The president of the state medical society, Dr. Mario E. Motta, also urged caution. “A big transition like this has never been done on such a broad scale,” Dr. Motta said, “so it must be done very carefully, deliberately and
thoughtfully.”

In Massachusetts, turning the battleship toward global payment systems appears to be recognized as a necessity if the 2006 reform plan that's already achieved near-universal coverage is not to bankrupt the state, as it's beginning to do. (Of course, the state has only taken a baby step toward reforming the payment system.) Will federal legislation have to follow the same road - extend coverage first, deal with the resulting financial emergency as it takes hold?

Did Obama read Atul Gawande? - cont.

Last week, I wondered whether Obama had read Atul Gawande's eureka-inducing article on why U.S. healthcare costs are so high, noting that Obama cited Gawande's chief example of a care center where costs are low and outcomes excellent, the Mayo Clinic, while highlighting before a Senate audience the imperative to reduce dramatic variations in costs among different communities.

Had I done my homework, I would have known that the answer was "yes" -- or more precisely, that Obama's brain on healthcare, Peter Orzag, not only read read Gawande, but went to town blogging on Gawande's conclusions and in particular on Gawande's spotlight on McAllen TX, the low income town with one of the highest per capita Medicare tabs in the country. On May 28, Orzag noted that Gawande's tale of two healthcare markets richly illustrated his own theme that some markets pay dramatically more for healthcare than counterparts, with no apparent benefits. Then, on June 4, he delved deeper into McAllen's high costs, comparing them with his own favorite poster child for low costs/good outcomes, Grand Junction, CO:

For example, at the end-of-life, nearly half of all McAllen Medicare patients see 10 or more physicians, significantly more than the national rate of 30 percent (and in Grand Junction, Colorado, it is just 11% – more than four times less than the rate in McAllen). Also, McAllen’s Medicare patients have 50 percent more cardiac surgery procedures as the national average (about 24 per 1000, versus about 16 per 1000), four times the ambulance spending during end-of-life, and eight times the home health care costs. Medicare spending per enrollee in the last two years of life also varies greatly among McAllen and other peer hospitals.

This week, Orzag was at it again, converting Gawande's core contrast into a policy mantra:

It’s certainly true that medical innovation is essential to improving treatment – and thus health outcomes – for us all. And it’s also true that we need to encourage doctors and researchers to explore and experiment in ways that lead to medical advances that save lives and improve their quality. But, today, the American health care system doesn’t always reward the best medical innovations – and one need look no further than McAllen, Texas to see that this is so.

Despite having a demographic profile similar to El Paso, Texas, and despite having had similar Medicare expenditures as El Paso as recently as 1992, McAllen’s spending grew about five times faster in the years since than in either El Paso or the United States as a whole. In return, McAllen got more medicine (more tests, more surgeries, more time in waiting rooms), but it didn’t get better health – McAllen scores lower than El Paso (and the U.S. average) in measures of health care quality. McAllen "innovated," and certain doctors and hospitals were financially rewarded, but I think we can all agree that this isn’t the kind of innovation we desire.

To get the most from innovation, we need to align incentives toward quality rather than intensity. The Mayo Clinic, synonymous the world over with cutting-edge medicine, has among the country’s lowest Medicare costs per beneficiary. Smaller medical markets, too, have managed to achieve such results: Grand Junction, Colorado is one of the lowest-cost and highest-quality places in the country to be treated. We need to reform the health care system so that it rewards the right kind of innovation – the Mayos, not the McAllens. And the Administration’s proposals aim to do precisely that through bundling of payments, incentives to reduce hospital readmission rates, and (as discussed below) a process through which MedPAC’s recommendations would enjoy fast-track protections in Congress (my emphasis).

Obama is singing from the same choir book. As in his June 2 address to senators, so in his June 2 letter to Senators Kennedy and Baucus, he highlighted the Mayo Clinic, replicating Gawande's thesis in the process:

We should ask why places like the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota, the Cleveland Clinic in Ohio, and other institutions can offer the highest quality care at costs well below the national norm. We need to learn from their success and replicate those best practices across the country (my emphasis).

Compare Gawande:

Most Americans would be delighted to have the quality of care found in places like Rochester, Minnesota, or Seattle, Washington, or Durham, North Carolina—all of which have world-class hospitals and costs that fall below the national average. If we brought the cost curve in the expensive places down to their level, Medicare’s problems (indeed, almost all the federal government’s budget problems for the next fifty years) would be solved. The difficulty is how to go about it. Physicians in places like McAllen behave differently from others. The $2.4-trillion question is why. Unless we figure it out, health reform will fail.

Among other cost-cutting measures, Obama also called for "'accountable care organizations'" to improve the quality of care for Medicare patients - apparently a bid to create the kind of outcomes-focused peer group Gawande highlighted in the Mayo Clinic.

Not to mix up cause and effect: Orzag has seized on Gawande's field research because it so precisely illustrates his own pet theses. But still it's remarkable to see that high quality piece of research and writing working its way so swiftly into the political process.

Updates:
Did Obama read Atul Gawande part 3
Orzag hones in on doctors' incentives

Did Obama read Atul Gawande?

It looks like Barack Obama read Atul Gawande last week.

Gawande's article in last week's New Yorker examining why healthcare is so expensive in the U.S. drew eurekas from hosts of readers. The main culprit, Gawande's exhaustive look at one of the country's most expensive healthcare markets suggests, is paying doctors by the procedure and thus creating financial incentives for prescribing expensive treatments. Gawande's Exhibit A is McAllen, Texas, where Medicare spends twice as much per capita as it does down the road apiece in El Paso. The reason seems to be that doctors in McAllen infected one another with an "entrepreneurial spirit":

One afternoon in McAllen, I rode down McColl Road with Lester Dyke, the cardiac surgeon, and we passed a series of office plazas that seemed to be nothing but home-health agencies, imaging centers, and medical-equipment stores.

“Medicine has become a pig trough here,” he muttered.

Dyke is among the few vocal critics of what’s happened in McAllen. “We took a wrong turn when doctors stopped being doctors and became businessmen,” he said.

Gawande's Exhibit B is the Mayo Clinic, where those incentives have been neutralized:

The core tenet of the Mayo Clinic is “The needs of the patient come first”—not the convenience of the doctors, not their revenues. The doctors and nurses, and even the janitors, sat in meetings almost weekly, working on ideas to make the service and the care better, not to get more money out of patients. I asked Cortese how the Mayo Clinic made this possible.

“It’s not easy,” he said. But decades ago Mayo recognized that the first thing it needed to do was eliminate the financial barriers. It pooled all the money the doctors and the hospital system received and began paying everyone a salary, so that the doctors’ goal in patient care couldn’t be increasing their income. Mayo promoted leaders who focussed first on what was best for patients, and then on how to make this financially possible.

No one there actually intends to do fewer expensive scans and procedures than is done elsewhere in the country. The aim is to raise quality and to help doctors and other staff members work as a team. But, almost by happenstance, the result has been lower costs.

Now listen to Obama, addressing Senate Democrats working on healthcare reform (as excerpted by Jonathan Cohn):

I want to just make mention of something that I've talked to many of you privately about. I want to say this publicly. As we move forward on health care reform, it is not sufficient for us simply to add more people to Medicare or Medicaid to increase the rolls, to increase coverage in the absence of cost controls and reform. And let me repeat this principle: If we don't get control over costs, then it is going to be very difficult for us to expand coverage. These two things have to go hand in hand. Another way of putting it is we can't simply put more people into a broken system that doesn't work.

So we've got to reform the underlying system. And this means promoting best practices, not just the most expensive practices. And one of the things I'm going to be discussing with the health and the finance committees is how can we change incentive structures so that, for example, places like Mayo Clinic in Minnesota are able to provide some of the best health care services in the country at half or sometimes even less of the costs than some other areas where the quality is not as good. What we should be--and by the way, that's not just unique to Mayo. The Cleveland Clinic in Ohio, same thing: top-notch quality, lower costs.

Now, the Mayo Clinic's success is not exactly a secret, and Peter Orzag, Obama's budget director, is one of the country's foremost experts on healthcare costs. So maybe this exhortation didn't come straight out of Gawande. But it's hard to shake the impression that the article was in Obama's mind.

UPDATE: Peter Orzag, Obama's healthcare brain, has been all over the Gawande article.